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Positivism, Humanism, and Hegemony:
Sovereignty and Security for Our Time*
Frederic Gilles Sourgens**
I. Introduction
International law is experiencing a paradigm shift. The idea of
sovereignty is coming under increasing attack from academic treatises
and practical exigencies. Scholars like the late Susan Strange are
declaring that the sovereign is no longer fit to govern in the face of
highly mobile, extremely well-funded corporate and criminal
enterprises.' Senior political figures are equally calling for a re-
evaluation of the concept of sovereignty in the light of recent political
integrations in the European Union. 2 Diplomats and judges have also
conceded that the current conception of sovereignty is ill-equipped to
deal with questions of international peace and security.3 With the
concept of sovereignty strained, the very fabric around which structured
* Note on citation format: This article will generally follow the Blue Book. An
exception is made where sources used are traditionally referred to by a classical citation
format. This format refers to either the traditional abbreviated name of the work or the
name of the author. Rather than a page reference, the format references book, chapter
and section of the relevant citation. Where a translation was readily available, it was also
cited in Blue Book format for the reader's convenience.
** Attorney-at-Law. This article does not reflect the views of my law firm; the
opinions expressed are solely my own. J.D., Tulane University Law School; M.A.,
Political Philosophy, University of York (U.K); candidatus magisterii, Latin and
Philosophy, University of Oslo (Norway). I would like to thank Professor Gunther Handl
for his guidance and advice. His help and encouragement were instrumental in writing
this article.
1. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, THE RETREAT OF THE STATE: THE DIFFUSION OF
POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY (1997).
2. See generally ROBERT COOPER, THE BREAKING OF NATIONS: ORDER AND CHAOS
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2003).
3. See Prosecutor v. Dragan Nikolic, Case No. IT-94-2-S, Judgment, 30-32
(Dec. 18, 2003). In setting up international tribunals, U.N. diplomats implicitly
recognized that the current system of sovereignty posed a threat to international peace
and security under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. Prosecutors were unable to bring to
justice the most violent perpetrators of crimes against humanity because Chapter VII
shielded these criminals with sovereign immunities.
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solutions to problems of international peace and security are constructed
is called into question. Yet, sadly, too little theoretical work is currently
being performed by international lawyers to suggest a solution to the
most pressing problems of this foundational concept of law.4 This article
will take an accounting of state sovereignty and attempt a reevaluation of
the concept. The question it asks is what the main alternatives to a
positive system of state sovereignty are.
This article starts from the traditional premise that sovereignty as a
functional concept must serve some greater good than the preservation or
expansion of state power.5 The lack of attention to higher order
principles by the international community is causing some of the erosion
of the concept.6 This article posits that such an attack is warranted. As
such, this article attempts to cast sovereignty as a legal concept
recognizing the traditional higher order principles of fundamental human
rights. It arrives at the conclusion that a humanist, federal conception of
sovereignty remains the best answer to the new challenges of
international peace and security. This conclusion is by no means
revolutionary; to the contrary, it follows a traditionalist reading of the
theory of public international law. Yet, such a traditionalist reading is a
needed counterweight to much of the current "neoconservative" literature
on point.
Due to the underlying shifts in legal perspective, any treatment of
state sovereignty must acquaint itself with its historical development.7
At its center is the question of what led to the adoption of the current
system of state sovereignty. The answer to this question is especially
pressing, as sovereignty developed as a political concept first and as a
legal axiom second. Both of these processes, the original political
conception of sovereignty, and its later canonization in international law,
are inherently historical.8  Conceptions of sovereignty were the
functional answer to the political power struggles of their day.9
Misunderstanding this political aspect of the law thus would lead to a
4. See SIR ROBERT JENNINGS, Sovereignty and International Law, in STATE,
SOVEREIGNTY, AND INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 87-99 (Gerard Kreijen ed., 2002).
5. See EMERICH DE VATTEL, LE DROIT DES GENS 1.4, § 39, 51 (1758) [hereinafter
VATTEL]; EMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS 13, 17 (Joseph Chitty ed., 1879)
[hereinafter VATrEL TRANS.]; Joseph Ratzinger (Benedict XVI), Die Seele Europas,
Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Apr. 13, 2004, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/ausland/artikel/656/
51605/4/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
6. See, e.g., COOPER, supra note 3; Dragan Nikolic, IT-94-2-S, at 30-32.
7. See GEORG JELLINEK, ALLGEMEINE STAATSLEHRE 421 (2d ed. 1905).
8. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 24 (2003) (on the
pragmatic value of history in the formation of law); see generally HANS GEORG
GADAMER, WAHRHEIT UND METHODE (Siebeck 1990) (on the value of history in general).
9. See, e.g., JEAN BODIN, ON SOVEREIGNTY: FOUR CHAPTERS FROM THE SIX BOOKS
OF THE COMMONWEALTH (Julian H. Franklin ed., 1992) [hereinafter BODIN TRANS.].
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myopic and dangerous perspective on one of the axioms of the current
international order.10
To shed light on the political development of sovereignty, this
article looks first to the historical origins of the concept. It investigates
the Roman law roots of sovereignty and its early sprouts in the Middle
Ages. This investigation quickly shows the practical and conceptual
problems of the Rinascimento l with the prevailing ideas of political
power and its response with the first full conception of sovereignty."
From these doubts arose the conception of sovereignty found in Hugo
Grotius and its codification at MUnster and Osnabrick at the cusp of the
Northern Renaissance.
1 3
This Northern Renaissance conception of sovereignty is largely
credited for the current paradigm of the equal sovereign power of states
in their states and the positive consent model of international law.
14
While this attribution is sufficient for most introductory treatments of
sovereignty, it remains very imprecise. In order to remedy this lack of
precision, this article will trace the current conception of sovereignty to
the Congress of Vienna and the Nineteenth-Century balance of power
between the European Great Powers. This historical distinction is
important. The Congress of Vienna led to the paradigm shift toward a
positive understanding of sovereignty. The earlier Renaissance
understanding of sovereignty was still anchored in natural law
jurisprudence. The solution brokered at Vienna created a reactionary
system of sovereignty meant to protect the status quo ante of autocracy
and geopolitical stalemate in Europe. As such, it was not intellectually
compelling. It was maintained by necessity, rather than by choice; 15 any
noticeable shift in the European balance of power being thought of as a
vital security threat and likely cause for war. With the end of the Cold
War, this necessity appears to have vanished irrevocably.
16
Any legitimate alternative to the positive system, however, still has
to be an organic continuation of existing international legal tradition.'
7
The positivist and voluntarist conceptions of territorial sovereignty
10. See JELLINEK,supra note 8, at 421.
11. The Rinascimento is the Italian Renaissance.
12. See generally 1 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL
THOUGHT (1978) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
13. See HUGO GROTIUS, DE lURE BELLI AC PACIS 1.3, 1.4 (1625) [hereinafter
GROTIUS]; HUGO GROTIUS, THE LAW OF WAR AND PEACE 38-67 (Louise R. Loomis trans.,
1949) [hereinafter GROTIUS TRANS.].
14. See, e.g., John H. Jackson, Sovereignty-Modern, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 782 (2003).
15. See generally COOPER, supra note 3.
16. Id.
17. See ALASDAIR MCINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY 209-25
(1984) (on the normative value of tradition).
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always were little more than a compromise solution to the European
problems of the Nineteenth Century.18  Hence, an apt recasting of
sovereignty should look to develop an earlier strand of legal tradition
stopped by political necessity rather than by reasoned choice. There are
two such rival conceptions which already are stepping to the forefront of
political action and academic discourse: hegemony and federation.
Doubts have been expressed as to whether a legal order based on
hegemony is feasible today. 19 Nevertheless, important theoretical first
steps have been laid for a system of loose international hegemony. Such
hegemony would more resemble the Holy Roman Empire of the Middle
Ages than its classical namesake. The legal characteristic of such an
Empire includes first and foremost the sovereign superiority of the
imperial power. The imperial power is the new first among equals of the
community of nations. Such superiority is expressed in its right of
intervention in the territory of sister states and its claim to mediate in
their woes with each other. It is founded on the ideological claim to
allegiance through a common ethos of which the hegemon is the
appointed guardian. Those who share in this ethos owe diplomatic
deference to the hegemon. Nations which do not pay homage to this
common ethos are viewed with deep suspicion and are subjected to the
constant threat of designation as a "rogue state," or worse, the next target
of intervention.
This line of thought has found remarkable resonance in the
neoconservative reception of Samuel P. Huntington's Clash of
Civilizations.20 It also serves as a potential underlying justification for
the departure in rhetoric and actions of key western states from
traditional international legal standards in light of the attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.,
and the bombings in London and Madrid. 21 This article argues that such
a hegemonic position fails. Its reorganization of sovereignty would
destroy the normative force of international law and would replace it
with the autocratic and arbitrary rule of force. Such a system further
impoverishes the culture of fundamental rights. It endangers legal
stability due to its lack of predicable, substantive rules. Hence, it is a
poor alternative to the current state of affairs.
18. See WILHELM G. GREWE, EPOCHEN DER VOLKERRECHTSGESCHICHTE 502-08
(1984) [hereinafter GREWE].
19. See generally COOPER, supra note 3.
20. See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE
REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1998).
21. See, e.g., CNN.com, Blair: Western Values Must Triumph over Radical Islam,
Aug. 2, 2006, http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/08/01/mideast.blair/index.html
(last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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The far more intellectually satisfying solution to the problem of
sovereignty looks to the Rinascimento for inspiration, rather than to the
Middle Ages. As did the Rinascimento, it rediscovers the wealth of legal
learning handed to us by ancient Rome.22 In its ideal form, this
conception of sovereignty returns to the roots of the natural law tradition
and views the respect of human dignity as the overriding source of
23sovereignty . Due to this commitment to a higher value, sovereignty
again becomes a functional concept of international good rather than
national power. The most important characteristic of such a system is
the recognition of legal norms which purport to bind sovereign nations
not because of the sovereign consent, but because of their own inherent
force. Typically, a system relying on such norms will construct
supranational structures of governance to protect and enforce these
norms. A federation of states crystallizes around these values and their
corresponding legal norms through a common system of discourse and
governance.
This system of international reorganization was clearly on the rise in
one form or another, even in the days of the Cold War.24 With the
demise of the Soviet Union and hence the demise of the need for a
balance of power, it sped more prominently onto the world stage. 5
Sadly the realization came all too quickly that even such a federal system
of sovereignty had gross failings, as became clear in the Balkans,
Somalia and Haiti. Even the latest poster child of the more optimistic
federal outlook, the International Criminal Court, did little to convince
the world of its systemic feasibility or even its intellectual merit. This
article concludes that one of the most important reasons for the failure of
the federal system of sovereignty has been the widespread
misunderstanding of its theoretical basis by scholars and political actors.
In attempting a postmodern justification for the newly emerging regime,
many commentators are still too entrenched in the modern positivist,
voluntarist paradigm. Others who are not so entrenched often lack the
historical and philosophical training to propose a coherent alternative
26system. A proper historical understanding of sovereignty is rare and is
22. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13.
23. See 1 JUSTINIAN, JUSTINIAN'S DIGEST ch. 1 9 (Alan Watson ed. and trans., U.
Penn. 1998).
24. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 53, opened for signature May
23, 1969, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 [hereinafter Vienna
Convention].
25. See generally COOPER, supra note 3.
26. See, e.g., Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L.
REV. 311 (2002). For a succinct critique of the federation model of international law, see
ALFRED VERDROSS & BRUNO SIMMA, UNIVERSELLES VOLKERRECHT, THEORIE UND PRAXIS
31 (3d ed. 1984).
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often overlooked due to the scarcity of contemporary proponents. Yet, it
is exactly such an understanding that is required to put the concept of
sovereignty on the right hook.
II. A Genealogy of Sovereignty
The idea of sovereignty is tied to the question of state power. 27 Its
history, therefore, is one of power struggles and ancillary battles over
legal definitions. The ultimate question of sovereignty historically has
been: in whom does ultimate authority and power vest? Many
alternatives have been presented: the commonwealth, the church, the
emperor, and finally, the state. This struggle has left visible lines in the
face of history, philosophy and the law. To understand these struggles
over legal definitions correctly, it is of pivotal importance to grasp the
common Roman law heritage of all proposed solutions.
While the many different alternatives to sovereignty are deeply
indebted conceptually to the Roman law, Roman law itself did not
conceive of public law in terms of sovereignty. In fact, the concept of
sovereignty is not easily applied in Roman law, as the term was coined in
28the Renaissance. As is often pointed out, sovereignty as a concept is
considered to have been foreign to Antiquity.29 Yet, the very absence of
such a foundational principle of public law is deeply puzzling. After all,
the modern idea of sovereignty was developed from Roman law sources
by two humanist legal scholars, Alciato and Bodin.30 The first question,
therefore, is: what material did Rome provide for our conception of
sovereignty and why did it lack a conception of sovereignty in its own
age?
Bodin traces the origin of sovereignty to the Roman concept of
summa potestas.31  This potestas, or power, in Roman law was
understood in terms of imperium, the power to give valid and binding
orders. Imperium is hence a legal concept which needs to be further
probed.32 The Roman conception of imperium was very different from
our own. Power emanated from one focal point and its application was
universal throughout the known world.33  Roman law creates the
impression that power was essentially unified both internally and
27. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 26.
28. See id.; JEAN BODIN, Six LIVREs DE LA RtPUBLIQUE 1.8 (1576) [hereinafter
BODIN]; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 1.
29. See, e.g., JELLINEK, supra note 8, at 421-26 (2d ed. 1905).
30. See BODIN, supra note 29, at xiv-xv.
31. Id.
32. See EUGENE PETIT, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DU DROIT ROMAIN 647 (1906);
CHARLES DE VISSCHER, THEORIES ET REALITES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 11
(1970).
33. DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 12.
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externally. In Bodin's analysis, the Roman law gave ultimate authority
to, and penned its constitution in terms of, the people of Rome. It is
therefore unsurprising that analytically, the power of the State was
premised not on its territory, but on the bloodline of its citizens, ius
sanguinis rather than ius soli.
34
Antiquity generally considered statehood in terms of nationality and
national origin rather than in terms of territory. This is reflected not only
in Roman law, but also in Roman literature. For example, is it is reprised
in the epos of the origins of Rome, Virgil's Aeneid. Virgil clearly
identifies Aeneas, son of Aphrodite and hero of Troy, and not the Latium
itself-the true seat of Roman identity. The work served the larger
political purpose of tracing the ruling family of Rome, the Julii, back to
foreign divinity and not to its domestic territorial roots. The Roman law
remained remarkably consistent in its application of public jurisprudence
based on heritage. The Roman state only accorded rights to its own
citizens or nationals. All others-and their possessions, mobile or
immobile-Roman law considered free for the taking.36  The only
exception to this rule was the establishment of a treaty of friendship
between Rome and the foreign state.37 As a general matter, Rome
entered into such treaties on the basis of equality of nations in its early
days and later on used treaties to formalize the relations of other states as
vassals to Rome.
The Roman conception of power is somewhat savage at first blush.
Analytically, it applies the radical natural law theory of capture to
international relations. Rome viewed the entire world as a terra nullius
waiting for Roman colonization. If such colonization would prove
impossible, it allowed for the temporary grant of equality by treaty to the
foreign state. These treaties would set forth the rules of sovereign
comity and the facilitation of trade. Rome, however, was not kept for
long to the terms of its treaties. In the words of Robert Cooper, Rome's
conception of sovereignty was that of empire, of hegemony.38 While an
34. See JUSTINIAN, supra note 24, at ch. 1 9; FRIEDRICH CARL VON SAVIGNY,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, AND THE LIMITS
OF THEIR OPERATION IN RESPECT OF PLACE AND TIME 57-60 (William Guthrie trans.,
1880).
35. VIRGIL, AENEID.
36. See 3 F. LAURENT, ETUDES SUR L' HISTOIRE DE L'HUMANITE 28-31(1880).
37. See id.; COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CUSTOM OF
ANCIENT GREECE AND ROME 213, 217-26 (1911).
38. COOPER, supra note 3, at 7. Importantly, Roman hegemony differs from its
medieval and contemporary siblings in at least two respects. Roman hegemony did not
truly act on an "international" stage; as a legal concept, it operated on a domestic level
regarding the domestic legality of a person's actions. It also did not codify the
consequences of hegemonic sovereignty on the internal affairs of neighboring states. In
other words, the Roman concept of hegemony did not provide a legal justification for the
2006]
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interesting stalemate between Rome and the Southem Italian Greek
colonies may have been possible at some point, the inner divisions of the
Mediterranean peoples rendered any compromises in Roman ambition
moot. 39 Once the rise of Rome to world dominion became all but
inevitable, there was no longer a need for Rome to develop a concept of
sovereignty because of external stimuli.
Even though Rome had a very intricate public law, it had little
reason to develop the idea of sovereignty internally. Power was
essentially unquestioned; the little questions that remained were solved
by the sword, not by legal deliberation. 40 As Georg Jellinek pointed out,
the idea of sovereignty developed because of the inherent conflict
between different parties all laying claim to the same power.4' While
Jellinek's vantage point on Roman history is somewhat dated, his
assertion that Rome never suffered the correct kind of such a struggle
42still holds true. More precisely put, the Roman constitutional struggle
moved Rome from a Republican constitution to a monarchy without
much time for legal discourse over legitimacy, and hence sovereignty, to
properly take off at Rome itself.43 The reason that Renaissance scholars
were nonetheless able to use Roman sources to construct the notion of
sovereignty is likely due to the distance with which they could perceive
the cataclysmic events of the last Republican century. With such
distance, they were able to extract the important legal lessons from the
power struggle between the Roman aristocracy, its citizens and the
Italian peoples finally received into Roman citizenship after a costly civil
war.44  In reading Cicero's philosophical works and the Roman
historians, it is possible to cast the debate in terms of a struggle for
imperium, or power, between the different orders of the state vying for
legitimacy.45 Viewed through this prism, it was possible for later
generations to use the Roman law, its history and -philosophical
underpinnings, to conceive of political power in terms of sovereignty.
supremacy of the Roman government over the internal affairs of foreign states.
39. See generally 1 THEODOR MOMMSEN, ROMISCHE GESCHICHTE (Deutscher
Taschenbuch Verlag 2001).
40. See, e.g., RONALD SYME, THE ROMAN REVOLUTION (Oxford Univ. Press 2002).
41. JELLINEK,supra note 8, at 426-39.
42. Id.
43. The notable exception here is Marcus Tullius Cicero, who put in place many of
the prerequisites of sovereignty. Arguably, Cicero therefore wielded a great influence on
the early modern genesis of public international law. Because this link is not essential to
this article, it will not be explored.
44. See generally SYME, supra note 41.
45. Indeed, civic humanism has consciously taken sides, favoring Cicero's
understanding of legitimate power against that of Gaius Julius Caesar and Gaius Julius
Caesar Octavian. See generally FRANCESCO PETRARCA, LETrERE DELL' 1NQUIETUDINE
(Carocci 2004); LEONARDO BRUNI, OPERE LETTERARIE E POLITICHE (UTET 1996).
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It was only with the fall of the Roman Empire that power, and hence
sovereignty, again became a problematic concept. While there was still
an Empire in the nominal sense after the coronation of Charlemagne in
800 A.D. as the new western emperor, forcible hegemony proved too
hard to achieve for any one nation. The discussion of sovereignty is
further complicated because the Middle Ages were not organized
politically in terms of nation-states.46 In theory at least, a universal
monarchy of Christendom, or at least occidental Catholic Christianity,
was still the highest source of legitimate power.47  Yet, feudal
principalities slowly challenged this fragile theoretical construct. 48 It
was between these two extremes, the universal conception of sovereignty
left from the Roman emperor, and the practical problems of rebellious
princes, that the medieval idea of feudal sovereignty emerged.49
The seminal author on medieval statehood and sovereignty proves
to be none other than Dante Alighieri.5 ° In his short treatise on
monarchy, Dante attempts to transpose the spiritual global authority of
the Pope into the temporal realm. 51 In this attempt, he seeks to maintain
the medieval universalist aspiration of scholastic natural law.52 For
Dante, there ought to be one temporal ruler of Christendom and the
world.53 Dante reaches this conclusion by means of classical learning.
He analyzes political society in terms community attachment, drawing
ever wider concentric circles out from the immediate family until it
incorporates all of humankind.54 Continuing in the vein of classical
education, he posits that each of these circles needs a ruler-the
paterfamilias, the mayor, the prince.55 Yet, he does not end his analysis
with the prince. Rather, Dante looks to the outermost circle-that
encompassing all of humanity-as the most important.56 Here, he posits
46. See GREWE, supra note 19, at 57. The term sovereignty is used here in an
ahistorical manner to describe the highest order authority recognized by states'
contemporary legal structures.
47. See id. at 77; DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 12.
48. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 14.
49. For an excellent historical exploration of the medieval international law in light
of these struggles, see GREWE, supra note 19, at 57-71.
50. See VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 26; ERNST CASSIRER, NATUR-UND
VOLKERRECHT 61-68 (1919). See generally DANTE ALIGHIERI, MONARCHIA (Ruedi
Imbach & Christoph Fliieler eds., 1989) [hereinafter MONARCHIA].
51. See CASSIRER, supra note 51, at 64.
52. For a discussion of the scholastic natural law tradition and its influence on the
development of international law, see GREWE, supra note 19, at 108-18; FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 13; see generally RICHARD TUCK, NATURAL RIGHT THEORIES: THEIR ORIGIN
AND DEVELOPMENT (1981) [hereinafter NATURAL RIGHT].
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that there also must be a ruler: a monarch, or Christian emperor.57
Dante provides us great insight into the political and legal problems
of his day. The power of a ruler for all of Christendom was no longer
self-evident. It now required a theoretical defense. By choosing
universal monarchy, Dante attempts to somehow foreclose the
splintering of power which had already occurred and was speeding ahead
even further.58 He acutely understood the communitarian basis of
international law in his era; indeed, it was the solidarity of princes and
free cities that formed the backbone of medieval Europe. 59  Dante
attempts to persuade his audience that the occidental Christian
communities needed a unity of government in the form of the emperor.
Here, Dante's suggestion stood in opposition to the other natural
conclusion from the formation of such communities: that of
confederation based on similar values and political needs.
While this conflict looks peculiarly like our own, one should not
draw analogies too far. The medieval mind did not think in terms of
states, but more in terms of "commonwealths,, 60 or "polities.",61 These
commonwealths were organized as feudal realms, with the warrior prince
at its head and his military order as the necessary social coagulant,62
bearing a striking resemblance in structure to the Platonic ideal of
tripartite rule of the guardian philosopher, the guardian military class and
the merchant class. The most obvious difference between the modem
state and these commonwealths was that the prince's power was based
on his personal imperium, not his territory jurisdiction. Due to this
immediate basis of power in his orders and actions, these became a
crucial focal point of sovereignty. It is noteworthy that the Middle Ages
still recognized the right and duty of subordinates to hold their rulers
accountable if their acts were unworthy of sovereign rule. In this way,
they could be aided rightfully by neighboring sovereigns. The medieval
social order was so deeply based in religion, morality and honor that
even its ruling classes could not escape its grasp.63
Nevertheless, the concept of national sovereignty arose out of the
Middle Ages, possibly even as a response to the ever growing gap
between the universalist theory of law and its feudal practice. The
Rinascimento took up feudal practice, and in intertwining with humanist
57. Id.
58. See JELL1NEK, supra note 8, at 426-39.
59. See GREWE, supra note 19, at 80-81.
60. Id. at 83.
61. This was Michael Byers' translation of Grewe's original term, "Gemeinwesen."
See WILHELM G. GREWE, THE EPOCHS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (Michael Byers trans.,
2000).
62. See GREWE, supra note 19, at 84.
63. Id. at 96.
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learning and legal scholarship, developed for the first time a coherent
legal theory of the nascent state. The full rediscovery of the Roman law
and its interpretation paired with a rekindled interest in the Roman
political ideals slowly ate away at the medieval ideals of a universal
Christian hegemony of the emperor.64 With the growing awareness of
the political aspects of power, it finally vanished from the European
scene.
Due to growing political awareness of the Rinascimento, two
diametrically opposed theories started to take flight: a natural law theory
anchored in the Graeco-Roman, stoic understanding of a universal
community, and its absolutist rival. This latter conception would evolve
into our idea the state, stopping at nothing to cement the new found
political power into permanent, positive sovereignty.65 The conception
of the positive state evolved from la ragione di stato.66 The ragione di
stato spawned a genre of political literature addressing questions of
67 ctd.68proper governance. Its most cited work was Machiavelli's Principe.
Machiavelli argues for the emergence of a new political entity-state,
rather than commonwealth. At the core of this new entity was the newly
emerging conception of imperium-that of the prince.
69
The conception of state power was put in terms of "sovereignty" for
the first time some forty-five years after the publication of the prince by
Jean Bodin.70 It proved the natural conclusion of the legal learning of the
Rinascimento: a balancing point between a strongly state-driven political
theory and existing natural jurisprudence.7 1 Bodin defines sovereignty as
the absolute and perpetual power of the commonwealth resting in the
hands of the state.72 It provides an external demarcation against the
intrusion of outside powers into the realm of the state.73 Furthermore, it
establishes the internal power of the state over its subjects.74 While there
is some interesting discussion as to which of these two aspects is at the
64. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 17.
65. Compare NICOLO MACHIAVELLI, IL PRINCIPE and I DISCORSI, in 1 NICOLO
MACHIAVELLI, OPERE (UTET 1999) with DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 21-22.
66. GREWE, supra note 19, at 197.
67. FOUNDATIONS,supra note 13, at 113-38.
68. Whether the Principe in fact falls into the category of ragione di stato has been
questioned by scholars on numerous occasions. See id.
69. See JELLINEK, supra note 8, at 441.
70. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 1-45; GREWE,
supra note 19, at 198.
71. BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 89-109.
72. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8, 2.1; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 1-45, 89-109.
73. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.10; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 49. GREWE,
supra note 19, at 198.
74. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 32-45; VERDROSS
& SIMMA, supra note 27, at 26-27.
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
heart of Bodin's thought-the positivist or the naturalist-it is truly the
balance of both concerns that is responsible for Bodin's lasting
importance, irrespective of his historically correct exegesis.75
For Bodin, the state is analytically the repository of sovereignty,
whether the state is defined by its prince, its nobles or its people.76
Sovereign power is that which is used in its own right and not in the
capacity of a stewardship.77 In other words, sovereignty requires full
political independence. Nevertheless, sovereignty is both internally and
externally limited for Bodin. Natural law internally limits sovereignty.
As sovereignty is power used to just ends through law in the image of
God, logic dictates that sovereign decrees be limited to the confines of
natural law.78 For Bodin, one such example of an internal limitation of
sovereignty was the inviolability of property rights and the ensuing need
for just compensation in the case of a taking.79 However, this internal
limitation on sovereignty was severely curtailed by the lack of remedies
against its breach; subjects were limited to civil disobedience and were
denied the right to revolution.8 °
Sovereignty was externally limited by the law of nations.8 In as far
as the sovereign had entered into treaties, and to the extent that
customary ius gentium was not unjust, the law of nations was binding on
the sovereign. Interestingly, the justification for the binding nature of the
law of nations already has certain modern undertones. Because
sovereignty is the source of all legal obligation, the sovereign can only
incur obligations through its acts of voluntary submissions to an oath or
contract. 83 Where such a contract was entered into, it was binding on the
sovereign because of its formal, voluntary assent to its terms.
84
Customary law was justified in line with the internal limitation on
sovereignty; these were just and necessary obligations required to
maintain sovereignty. Still, for Bodin this external limitation had
75. It is this author's contention that the correct exegesis is one that is slanted
heavily in favor of the communitarian natural law roots of classical learning, rather than a
positivist state-centered reading. It is in this sense that Bodin is later used in the final
section of this paper. See infra Part V.
76. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8, 2.1; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 2, 90.
77. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 7.
78. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 45.
79. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 41. Bodin quotes
Seneca: "Omnia rex imperio posidet, singuli dominio." (The king is vested with all
power, the individual with all ownership).
80. BODIN, supra note 29, at 2.5; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 120.
81. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 45; VERDROSS &
SIMMA, supra note 27, at 26-27.
82. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 12-13,23.
83. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 35.
84. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.8; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 35.
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somewhat more bite than its internal sibling. It was, in fact, enforceable.
Violations of treaty obligations or truly international rules of conduct
could easily give rise to a just cause for war. Furthermore, foreign
sovereigns also had the right to enforce the law of nations in internal
affairs in cases of tyrannical governments where a tyrant was "notorious
for rapine, murders and cruelties toward his subjects. 85 Outside of these
constraints, however, sovereignty is defined as the ultimate authority to
make and enforce law in the worldly sphere; logic dictates that it is
unconstrained from further external interference.86
It is fair to say that Bodin did not only coin the term sovereignty; he
defined it. From there on out, the legal principle of sovereignty would
rarely look back to Bodin's sources. Beginning with Grotius,
international lawyers and scholars developed Bodin's concept further.
87
Yet, from that point until today, few have ever rejected it. The most
important early contribution to this new legal principle was made by
Grotius.88 Grotius' understanding of the sovereign further built on
Bodin's work. The sovereign became even more powerful internally and
more impermeable externally. Grotius places little of the natural law
limitations on the sovereign which Bodin still posits. 89  The Grotian
theory of sovereignty does not derive from divine grace, but from the
contractual bond between state and subject. 90 This contractual device
allows Grotius to severely mitigate the natural law conclusions still
necessary in Bodin's conceptual framework. Further, natural law only
limits the state externally to the extent of truly international incidents, as
its citizens are not allowed to resist it; they only have the right-and the
duty-to disobey unjust commands.91 It governed the behavior between
states. It did not allow the intervention of one state in the affairs of
another outside of the presence of certain extremely rare factors, such as
the oppression of an entire people by a foreign, conquering monarch.92
This strong theory of sovereignty is often referred to as the
Westphalian system of international law, which refers to the peace treaty
signed at the end of the Thirty Year's War in 1648.93 However, this
85. BODIN, supra note 29, at 2.5; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 113 n. 1.
86. BODIN, supra note 29, at 1.10; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 55-56 ("The first
prerogative of a sovereign prince is to give law to all in general and each in particular...
without consent of any other, whether greater, equal, or below him").
87. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.3, 1.4; GROTIuS TRANS., supra note 14, at 38-67.
88. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.3, 1.4, GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 38-67.
89. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.4.7; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 62-65.
90. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.3.8; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at44.
91. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.4.7; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 62-65.
92. GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.5; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 58-69.
93. See generally GENE M. LYONS & MICHAEL MASTANDUfNO, BEYOND
WESTPHALIA?: STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION (1995).
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attribution of modem-day sovereignty to the thought of the late Northern
Renaissance is more confusing than it is helpful. The concept of
sovereignty as it is often associated with the Westphalian system has
been considered to be an outright license for the state to treat its subjects
with impunity. In the words of a contemporary writer, this notion of
sovereignty "could be characterized as the nation-state's power to violate
virgins, chop off heads, arbitrarily confiscate property, torture citizens,
and engage in all sorts of inappropriate actions. ' 94 This conception of
sovereignty is decidedly not part of the Northern Renaissance. 95 Even in
its most potent formulation, early sovereignty was still deeply anchored
in the moral discourse of Cicero and Tacitus. It was very much part of a
tradition which condemned tyranny in the starkest of terms. Certainly,
by the time Grotius wrote on sovereignty, the impassioned defense of the
tyrannicide of Cicero had been left for dead in the writings of civic
humanists. 96 Yet, it still was committed to Tacitus; citizens still had a
right to seek in their disobedience and death a more just future.
97
In fact, the revolutions of 1688, 1776, and 1789 still drew on the
very discourse which Grotius sought to mitigate. 98 In the final analysis
through to 1814, sovereignty always rested on the benevolent use of state
power.99 While absolutism slowly ate away at this theoretical foundation
of sovereignty to the benefit of regal power, it never quite displaced it.100
Only the concerted action of all of Europe and Russia, as well as the
94. Jackson, supra note 15, at 790.
95. See GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.4, 1.5; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 58-
69.
96. Compare CICERO, DE OFFICIIS, in MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON DUTIES (Walter
Miller trans., 1913) with GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.4.
97. See 1 TACITUS, THE HISTORIES ch. 3 (D.S. Levene ed., Oxford 2001).
[Non tamen adeo virtutum sterile saeculum ut non et bona exempla prodiderit.
Comititae profugos liberos matres, secutae maritos in exilia coniuges;
propinqui audentes, constantes generi, contumax etiam adversus tormenta
servorum fides; suprema clarorum virorum necessitates fortiter toleratae et
laudatis antiquorum mortibus pares exitus.
(Yet the age was not so barren in noble qualities, as not also to exhibit
examples of virtue. Mothers accompanied the flight of their sons; wives
followed their husbands into exile; there were brave kinsmen and faithful sons
in law; there were slaves whose fidelity defied even torture; there were
illustrious men driven to the last necessity, and enduring it with fortitude; there
were closing scenes that equaled the famous deaths of antiquity).
98. See generally CHRISTOPHER HILL, THE WORLD TURNED UPSIDE DOWN: RADICAL
IDEAS DURING THE ENGLISH REVOLUTION (1991); ALAIN DECAUX, DANTON ET
ROBESPIERRE (1979).
99. VATTEL, supra note 6, at 1.4, § 39, 51; VATTEL TRANS., supra note 6, at 13, 17.
100. See generally THE ENGLISH LEVELLERS (Andrew Sharp ed., 1998); JAMES
MADISON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON & JOHN JAY, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (Penguin 1987);
Ministrre de la Justice, Dclaration des droits de I' Homme et du citoyen, Aug. 26, 1789,
http://www.justice.gouv.fr/textfond/ddhc.htm (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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inaction of the Americas, finally buried this conditional conception of
sovereignty. In the place of natural law and humanist leaming,
positivism ruled the age.' 0 With positivism came the conception of
sovereignty as the right of the state to do on its territory as it saw fit. The
Concert of Nations sought to protect the reign of the ancien r~gime by
instituting an ever more powerful conception of the right of states to act
as they pleased on their own territory. 0 2 Sovereignty became vested in
the person of the king. 10 3 With this new base of sovereignty came the
voluntarist paradigm of sovereignty and its attempt to stare down the
scare of revolution. The single most defining event for this conception
of sovereignty was the Congress of Vienna.10 4
The Congress of Vienna established again the ancien regime in
Europe after the deluge of the French Revolution and the demise of the
progressive French Empire in 1814-1815.105 The newly established
Congress of Europe was founded on two complementary ideas: the
territorial redistribution of Europe according to pre-revolutionary
interests and the pre-revolutionary understanding of territorial
sovereignty. It was also spurred by Congress' institution of the first
"federal" Europe, which was an agreement between the Great Powers to
guide the fate of the continent through the means of a common
understanding. 10 6 Within the framework of this cooperative enterprise,
the counterintuitive reinforcement of the notion of sovereignty
developed. The voluntarist paradigm had found its first clear vehicle in
the Congressional mechanism for the Great Powers especially. The
Great Powers were guaranteed the continued existence of the status quo
ante, unless they would expressly agree to change it.
10 7
While Europe did not live in peace for much more than a generation
after this newly minted cooperative order, its principle clearly stuck. The
positivist order of sovereigny crystallized more clearly. It was perhaps
most aptly captured by Charles Calvo:
[L]e gouvernement d'un Etat, en tant que produit et instrument de la
souverainet6 du pays, peut entretenir deux sortes de relations
fondamentales: les unes, de droit public interne, c'est-A-dire celles
qu'il entretient au point de vue politique avec les citoyens ou sujets
101. See I CHARLES CALVO, LE DROIT DES GENS THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE, 118-19,
130 (3d ed. 1880).
102. GREWE, supra note 19, at 502-04.
103. See LASSE OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW A TREATISE 351 (Ronald Roxburgh
ed., 3d ed. 1920).
104. GREWE, supra note 19, at 502.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 508-16.
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places sous son action; les autres, de droit public externe ou de droit
international, qui embrassent tout ce qui concerne ses rapport avec
d'autres Etat.
0 8
Sovereignty was hence premised on the supreme authority of the state
internally and the external international personality of the state to bind it
in treaties and international custom.'0 9 With the advent of the Twentieth
Century, it gained ever greater importance. In the interwar period, it had
finally become the new orthodoxy. Since the 1920s, this orthodoxy had
not been credibly challenged by political events or a scholarly consensus
until today. Sovereignty from there on out was premised on the
independence of states from one another. 10  The sovereign state
maintained the highest prescriptive authority on its territory, as well as a
monopoly on physical power." Furthermore, sovereigns do not
recognize a higher prescriptive authority outside of the international law
which they have bound themselves to through their own consent."
2
III. Failures of the Current Conception of Sovereignty
The current paradigm of sovereignty relies on the internal exclusive
authority of the sovereign over its territory, and the external sovereignty
of the state to be bound in international law only through its own
consent. 13 This system of sovereignty evolved as further sophistication
of the previous Viennese system in the interbellum era. Its first principle
found multiple expressions in the judicial decisions of the age.
Academic writers today rely on the famous S.S. Lotus114 case's emphatic
endorsement of this voluntarist notion of international law based on the
independence of nations." 5 The Island of Palmas case is further cited
for the same proposition: "sovereignty ... between States signifies
independence."'"16 This conception of sovereignty has received its most
108. CALVO, supra note 102, at 146.
(The goverment of a state as the instrument and product of the country's
sovereignty can entertain two sorts of fundamental relations: the first have an
internal public law character, meaning those relations it maintains on a political
level with its citizens and subjects; the second have an internal public law, or
international law, character, meaning those relations that embrace all of its
dealings with foreign states).
109. Id.; OPPENHEIM, supra note 104, at 127.
110. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 28-29.
111. Id. at 29.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. S.S. Lotus Case (France v. Turkey), 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 9 (Sept. 7).
115. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 28; see also Bruno Simma & Andreas
Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts:
A Positivist View, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 302 (1999).
116. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 30 (citing Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v.
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definitive expression in the Friendly Relations Declaration of 1970.'17
The Friendly Relations Declaration broadly sets out the maxims of
independence and equality of sovereign states. 1 8 It categorically objects
to the intervention of any state in the internal affairs of another. It
codifies the equal rights and the right to self-determination of peoples.
Finally, it reaffirms the sovereign equality of states." 9 The Declaration
elaborates on the understanding that sovereignty requires all states to
respect the integrity of their peers. This means that no state may directly
or indirectly interfere in the right of the sovereign to regulate its internal
affairs as it sees fit. This duty of non-interference includes the fight of
the state to choose its own social and economic order without outside
interference.120 The only exception which is made to this principle of
absolute sovereignty is the right of the Security Counsel to act under
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter.'
2'
The mindset apparent in the Declaration shadows the political
necessities of its time. The Cold War had essentially driven the
Congressional Great Power model of cooperation to its positivist
extreme.122 A deadlock between the parties of the Cold War, as well as
the assurance of mutual destruction in an exchange of hostilities, forced
the international community to accept the consequences of positivism.
Calvo's principle of full internal autonomy had truly become the
accepted standard of international law.123 Against this background, it is
possible to understand the normative character of the Friendly Relations
Declaration. As a U.N. General Assembly Resolution, it clearly does not
create international law of its own accord. 24 Yet, because of the political
necessities of the times, the Declaration arguably assumed customary
international force.
U.S.), 2 R.I.A.A. 829, 838 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 1928)).
117. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations,
G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), at 121, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. A/5217
(Oct. 24, 1970) [hereinafter Friendly Relations Declaration]; see generally GAETANO
ARANGIO-RuIZ, THE U.N. DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND THE SYSTEM OF
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1979).
118. See generally Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 118; ARANGIO-RUIZ,
supra note 118.
119. See generally Friendly Relations Declaration, supra note 118.
120. On the reach of this provision of the Declaration in state practice, see generally
Lori Fisler Damrosch, Non-Intervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic
Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989).
121. U.N. Charter ch. III.
122. See generally Anthony Clark Arend, The United Nations and the New World
Order, 81 GEO. L.J. 491 (1993).
123. CALvO, supra note 102, at 146.
124. For a detailed analysis of the status of the Declaration as international law, see
generally ARANGIO-RUIZ, supra note 118.
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No incident in international law more fully supports this view than
the United States Supreme Court's decision in the Sabbatino case.1 25 In
Sabbatino, the U.S. Supreme Court de facto recognized the expropriation
of foreign-held property in Cuba by applying the act of state doctrine to
the controversy.12 6 The Court applied the doctrine because of its respect
for Cuba's sovereignty. 127 The Court then warned that it would not apply
the doctrine in the face of a clear violation of a rule of international
law. 128 However, this comment by the Supreme Court was mere window
dressing. At the time of Sabbatino, there was a rule of international law
which condemned the nationalization of alien property.129 Still, the
Court gladly set aside this rule of law, ostensibly because it felt that
Cuba's sovereign rights trumped the concerns of illegality. While this
rule was met with Congressional outrage as far too deferential to foreign
sovereign decisions, it nevertheless remained part and parcel of the
international legal discourse well into the 1980s. 130  The Sabbatino
environment, coupled with the Friendly Relations Declaration and the
general political climate from the 1960s to the mid-1980s, turned
sovereignty into a near absolutist maxim.
Interestingly, the crack in the system of positivism did not come
from the large stage of the Cold War itself. It was first articulated in the
nascent field of human rights law in 1966; the U.N. General Assembly
adopted the single most important human rights document of the
Twentieth Century: the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR). 131 It entered into force only ten years later. The ICCPR
implicitly started a gentle revolution for the concept of sovereignty; it
reintroduced the notion of limited and purposeful sovereignty rather than
absolute sovereignty. In the key articles of the ICCPR, it implicitly
limited sovereignty by making it illegal for states to extrajudicially put
any human being to death, to subject a human being to torture or
degrading punishment, to allow slave trading of compulsory labor, to
imprison a person for the nonperformance of a contract, to convict or
sentence a person of a crime without due process of law, not to recognize
125. Banco Naci6nal de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); on later influences
of the case, see for example Malvina Halberstam, Sabbatino Resurrected: The Act of
State Doctrine in the Revised Restatement of U.S. Foreign Relations Law, 79 AM. J. INT'L
L. 68 (1985); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Congress and Cuba: The Helms-Burton Act, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 419 (1996).
126. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 398.
127. Id. at 428.
128. Id. at 429.
129. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 391-407
[hereinafter IEL] (2003).
130. See Halberstam, supra note 126, at 68.
131. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res.
2200A (XXI), U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966).
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a human being as a person at law, and to infringe on the freedom of
conscience, thought and religion.
32
Yet, with this gentle revolution of sovereignty also came the
nagging question: does government action which violates these basic
human rights principles lack a sovereign quality?1 33  The positivist
system of law must answer this question in the negative. At the most,
these principles rise to the level of peremptory norms of international
law. Even if they rise to that level, however, states in positivist
jurisprudence would remain able to consent to their change. According
to the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it is possible to replace
peremptory norms of international law with other norms of a similar
character' 34 The very ability to change these human rights principles
means that the positivist jurisprudence cannot conceive of these rights as
being a condition of sovereignty at all. As states can consent to their
change through sovereign action, their sovereignty must of necessity be
independent of the human rights expressed in the ICCPR.
However, the first practical push to undermine absolutist
sovereignty derived from a different human right: the right of investors
not to be deprived of their property without prompt, fair, and adequate
compensation. 35 Hence, the "push" came in the guise of international
economic law and the growing conflict on the questions of
nationalization of foreign property. At the pinnacle of the voluntarist
sovereign paradigm, developing countries attempted to use the U.N.
General Assembly as a means to justify the nationalization of natural
resources and other expropriatory measures. These activities began in
1962 and stretched through the 1970s, when sovereignty again was
slowly curtailed to the benefit of property rights.136 During this period of
time, the least developed nations attempted to use sovereignty arguments
in order to effect property rights and general economic concerns. 37 The
most marked attempt to use sovereignty for these purposes was the
General Assembly's 1974 passage of the Declaration on the
Establishment of a New Economic Order.' 38 In this Declaration, these
132. Id. at arts. 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 15, 16, 18.
133. See infra Part IV.
134. Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at art. 64.
135. IEL, supra note 130, at 391-407 (2003).
136. See generally Declaration on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources,
G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), 17 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 17, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (Dec.
21, 1962); Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI) (May 1, 1974); Charter of the Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31 (Dec. 12, 1974).
137. See generally NOAH RUBINS & STEPHAN KINSELLA, INTERNATIONAL
INVESTMENT, POLITICAL RISK, AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION (2005).
138. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, supra
note 137; VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 311-15.
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states attempted to incorporate the so-called Calvo doctrine into general
international law; this doctrine would have deemed legal the
expropriation of alien property on the basis of sovereign power., 39 All
present in the sovereign jurisdiction are under the sovereign's regulatory
authority equally. Hence, one may not differentiate between the status of
foreigners and that of citizens under international law.
1 40
Once sovereignty took on such absolute vestiges, it had clearly
overreached. With the assertion of absolute prescriptive rights over their
territory, states were now responsible for a caricatured version of
sovereignty; the sovereign was now allowed to do as he pleased on his
own territory-no matter how distasteful his conduct. 14 1 By attempting
to take on the powerful economic interests of global investors, these
radical-and perhaps foolish-implications of voluntarist sovereignty
were uncovered and slowly rolled back. 142 In the field of international
economic law, it was international financial pressure which helped to
overcome the threat of ongoing nationalizations with the ratification of
over 1,100 Bilateral Investment Treaties over the last few decades.
143
Nevertheless, once the radical nature of the voluntarist theory on
sovereignty had been uncovered, it was difficult to undo its implications.
More often than not, sovereignty was perceived as a justification for the
erosion of systems of justice and the commission of gruesome
atrocities. 144 States were more than happy to fuel this perception of
sovereignty by relying on their sovereign rights to suppress domestic
civil rights movements, defending their actions internationally only by
reference to their sovereign right of non-interference in internal affairs. 1
45
While such a realization may well not have amounted to a legal critique
of the voluntarist sovereignty regime some twenty years ago, it does
139. See IEL, supra note 130, at 391-407.
140. See id.
141. Jackson, supra note 15, at 790.
142. See generally Bums H. Weston, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States and the Deprivation of Foreign Wealth, 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 437 (1981) (arguing for
a middle ground between the traditional compensation rule and the then new doctrine of
national treatment of foreign property).
143. See International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, Bilateral
Investment Treaties, http://www.worldbank.org/icsid/treaties/intro.htm (last visited Jan.
16, 2007).
144. This was the justification for the atrocities committed by the Russian Federation
in Chechnya. See Stephen Erlanger, Call for Talks at Deadline for Chechnya, N.Y.
TIMES (late ed.), Dec. 18, 1994, at 122. For the action of Serb forces during the
disintegration of Yugoslavia, see Chuck Sudetic, Another Yugoslav State Breaks Ties,
N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), Feb. 22, 1991, at A3.
145. One such example is the Uighurs in the People's Republic of China, who
admittedly get little attention in the international press. For a brief mention and
discussion of their status, see Harold Hongju Koh, The Case Against Military
Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 337, 343 (2002).
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amount to that today.
Today, the fundamental human rights codified by the ICCPR are
becoming increasingly important to the minds of international jurists, so
much so that they may well become a check against the abuse of
sovereignty, if not a precondition of its very existence. 146 Hence, it is
crucial to understand the 1984 assertion made by professors Verdross
and Simma that the classical voluntarist principle of sovereignty shall
remain unchallenged in the light of its times. 147  Then, voluntarist
sovereignty remained the fragile international compromise securing the
peaceful coexistence of the two super power blocs. 148 The moment that
necessity eroded, the previously inconsequential observations that
sovereignty indeed had been curtailed-and ought to be curtailed-again
became relevant.
49
This legal reaction to the end of the Cold War has been articulated
at great length in the last few years. 50  It looks to sovereignty in a
different light. Statements by jurists on international and domestic courts
that the value of sovereignty may be balanced against the importance of
the alleged misconduct by a state were altogether unthinkable under
traditional positivism; the impermeability of geographical frontiers, as
well as the normative supremacy of governmental acts on its own
territory are clearly undermined.' 5' If a court can disregard sovereignty
concerns, or deny that a governmental action rises to the level of a
sovereign act where it is wholly consummated on its domestic territory,
then the notion of sovereignty as it was conceived of in the last century is
no longer the prevailing legal orthodoxy. 52  This is importantly
underscored by the continued scholarly work of learned jurists in the
field.
153
Subsequently, the question becomes: what can take the place of this
understanding of sovereignty? While the complete dismissal of notions
of sovereignty is indeed part of the international legal literature today,
such thoughts are premature. 54 The essential query therefore becomes
not what concept will take the place of sovereignty, but how sovereignty
146. See COOPER, supra note 3; Dragan Nikolic IT-94-2-S, at 30-32.
147. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 37.
148. See COOPER, supra note 3, at 26-27.
149. See id.
150. See discussion of Calvo supra. For a very early example of a similar position in
U.S. domestic law, see the Hickenloper Amendment, Section 620(e)(2) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (2000)).
151. See Dragan Nikolic, IT-94-2-S, at 30-32.
152. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 35-37.
153. See, e.g., JENNNGS, supra note 5, at 27-44.
154. See Evelyn Ellis, Book Review: Neil McCormick, Questioning Sovereignty: Law,
State and Nation in the European Commonwealth, PuB. L., Spr. 2001, at 198-99.
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should be understood in its contemporary context. There are two options
before the world today, one cynical, and one idealistic. Both options
suffer from immense practical problems. The cynical position, in
addition to being theoretically flawed, may well prove untenable as a
matter of realpolitik. The idealistic approach still proves to be a frail
continuation of previous legal traditions. For the reasons that follow
however, it remains the best alternative.
IV. Hegemony as a New Paradigm of Sovereignty
Maybe the most natural solution to the problem of sovereignty is to
proclaim the last remaining super power and ostensible winner of the
Cold War the new hegemon. 155 In its hegemonic capacity, the United
States would be charged with the keeping of international order and the
resolution of international disputes. 156  The United States could also
assert its hegemonic position ideologically by pointing to its long-
standing Republican tradition.' 57 It may be argued that the Republican
principles of self-determination and the respect of human rights are the
ideals on which the laws of the United States are premised. After some
two hundred years of experience managing a Republican society, few
states would arguably be placed in a better position to firmly take the
reigns of world affairs.
Hegemonic legal theory has deep roots in the international law
tradition. 58  As explained previously, the historical development of
international law started with the conflicts between the church, the
emperor, and the multiple feudal lords in the Middle Ages."59 It is
therefore of little surprise to find that the main justification for hegemony
was already present in these early days. Dante's justification for imperial
rule still remains the main justification for any hegemonic order: any
community requires an effective leader to keep itself from falling into
disarray. 60  Regardless, there needs to be a final instance of dispute
resolution accepted by all to avoid the escalation of disputes.1 61 In a
155. See Tom J. Farer, Beyond the Charter Frame: Unilateralism or Condominium?
96 AM. J. INT'L L. 359-60 (2002).
156. See generally Michael Byers, Policing the High Seas: The Proliferation Security
Initiative, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 526 (2004) (discussing the arguably hegemonic role
assumed by the United States in policing the High Seas as constructed by John Bolton).
157. See Eliot A. Cohen, History and Hyperpower, FOREIGN AFF., July-Aug. 2004, at
49.
158. See generally Charles J. Reid, Legal History: "Am I By Law the Lord of the
World? " How the Juristic Response to Frederick Barbarossa 's Curiosity Shaped Western
Constitutionalism, 92 MICH. L. REV. 1646 (1994).
159. See supra Parts 1, 11.
160. See generally MONARCHIA, supra note 51.
161. Indeed, the lack of such final dispute resolution is currently partly blamed for
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hegemonic system, such authority is vested on the basis of accepted
physical preeminence and ideological supremacy. 162 These preconditions
were met, at least in theory, by the emperor in the Middle Ages as he was
recognized and anointed by the pope as the worldly arm of the Church. 1
63
Such recognition proved futile without the requisite physical power
needed to credibly wield the authority of this high office. When both
were met, however, Dante's argument certainly has some prima facie
credence. 64 In those circumstances, the imperial hegemon is accepted as
the spiritual center and effective ruler of the commonwealth.
The same justification could be used today as intellectual support
for a hegemonic reordering of sovereignty. The proponents of this
position argue that the military power of the United States stands
unchallenged in the world. Its troops are stationed in the Americas, Asia,
the Middle East, and Europe. 165 Holding the technological, numerical
and professional advantage over all other members of the international
community militarily, the United States may well be in a commanding
position to assert its hegemonic power. Further, as the leader of the
western world in the Cold War, the United States also holds ideological
clout.
The theoretical model of hegemonic sovereignty is relatively simple
to construct. It is based on similar principles as that of early natural law
sovereignty. It grants full sovereignty to the hegemonic power only.
166
It grants equal shares of residual sovereignty to the remaining nation
states. This residual sovereignty is premised on the faithful fulfillment of
international obligations by these nation states. The two main principles
of this model of sovereignty are still impermeability and authority.
67
These principles apply in the same manner as between nation states.
any of the political problems of the Middle Ages. See CHRISTOPHER TYERMAN, GOD'S
WAR, A NEW HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 42 (2006) ("One problem created by this mosaic
of private usurpation of public rights, which applied to areas with emergent towns such as
Flanders, the Rhineland or north Italy as much as in rural provinces, was the lack of
sovereign or effective arbitration"). The need for effective dispute resolution was also
painstakingly learned after two world wars. It was also the underlying rationale in the
establishment of the United Nations and its failed predecessor, the League of Nations.
See generally Leo Gross, Book Review: The League of Nations in Retrospect:
Proceedings of the Symposium Organized by The United Nations Library and The
Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva 6-9 November 1980, 80 AM. J. INT'L
L. 200 (1986).
162. See Cohen, supra note 158, at 49.
163. On the Middle Age conception of international law and the struggle between the
Church and the Emperor, see supra Part II.
164. See id.
165. See Michael R. Gordon, A Pentagon Plan Would Cut Back G.Is in Germany,
N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), June 4, 2004, at Al.
166. See generally MONARCHIA, supra note 51.
167. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 35-37.
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States still have a duty of non-interference towards each other. 168 This
means that between them, they may not take any action extraterritorially.
They are limited to referring the offending state to shared international
obligations. 169 If such an appeal were to fail, they may appeal to the new
hegemon. 1
70
The hegemon's full sovereignty is a form of global sovereignty.
17
The hegemon alone may make binding interpretations of international
law, adjudicate international disputes, and enforce the law worldwide. In
the natural law context of any hegemonic theory of law, this means that
the hegemon alone holds the summa potestas over all three branches of
government. It may create international legal standards through its
interpretation of the law, it may adjudicate disputes between lesser
sovereigns, and it may enforce the law as it sees fit.'
72
It may be argued as to whether hegemonic rule also requires the
benevolent use of this supreme power. 7 3  Classically speaking, the
justification for hegemony remained that the hegemon was in the best
position to keep the global well-being at heart-after all, this was the
very conception of political power in the Middle Ages that gave rise to
this particular means of international political organization. 174 On the
other hand, it may be that the hegemonic rule of one nation over all
others means that there is law for lesser states, and boundless rule for the
remaining imperial civilization.175 Of course, the practical implications
of hegemony always were somewhat less rosy than its theoretical
underpinnings would suggest. Systems of hegemony always are also
systems of unbridled power used towards the satisfaction of personal or
factional interests.176 This realpolitik implication of hegemony, whatever
its theoretical justification may be, has left indelible marks on world
history. The power struggles for the imperial throne in the Holy Roman
Empire are ample testament to this development. 177 Yet, these very real
implications also are the backdrop of much of the early history of the
Rinascimento and its struggle against papal and imperial hegemony.1
78
168. See U.N. Charter art. 2, 4.
169. Such a complaint would take the traditional form of a diplomatic note.
170. For such an arbitral practice, see generally M. Cary, A Roman Arbitration of the
Second Century B.C., 16 J. ROMAN STUDS. 194 (1926).
171. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 12.
172. See generally MONARCHIA, supra note 51; BODIN, supra note 29.
173. See VATTEL, supra note 6, at 1.4, § 39, 51 (1758); VATTEL TRANS., supra note 6,
at 13, 17.
174. See generally MONARCHIA, supra note 51.
175. See LAURENT, supra note 37, at 28-31.
176. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 128-38; see generally MACHIAVELLI, supra
note 66.
177. GREWE, supra note 19, at 55-157.
178. Therefore, the learned observer of international law does not need to look any
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Both theories of international stewardship and of self-interest are
represented in current hegemonist literature. Some hegemonists deny the
validity of international law altogether as applied to the hegemon, which
they identify as the United States. 179 Others suggest the former rationale
for hegemony, equally identifying the United States as the appropriate
hegemon.180 This view is most often associated with the neoconservative
school of thought.
Neoconservatives view the hegemon as the protector of
international democracy and of democratic values around the world.
They believe the main purpose of the protection and spread of
democratic values is the greater global stability which it will engender.
Neoconservatives advocate the use of force to achieve this goal. 181 The
use of force is justified in terms of the long-term stability that will flow
from a "democratized" world order. Neoconservatism as a conception of
hegemonic power is more of a stewardship position that is akin to early
natural law thinkers. It considers it an honor and a duty to intervene in
foreign states to instill good-meaning western-government in the local
political culture. 182  It hence wields its hegemonic might with the
religious fervor of the Christian crusaders of the Middle Ages. It seeks
to spread the new civic religion of democracy to the key countries in
unstable regions.
The latter neoconservative alternative is the only conception of a
new sovereignty fathomable under international law. Because the realist
position of hegemony boldly posits the irrelevance of international law, it
a priori takes itself out of any legal discourse. 83 Taken to its logical
conclusion, it argues for the unabashed superiority of the factional
interest of one state over any outside check whatsoever.' 84 It advocates
the end of law itself.'
85
The neoconservative position does not step into the same
intellectual debacle. To the contrary, it posits the higher authority of a
code of conduct to which the hegemon is bound. In its most ideal
formulation, it elevates basic human rights norms to become the
further than the seminal work on the Renaissance history of ideas to garner an accurate
portrayal of the interplay of power and political theory. See generally FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 13.
179. See generally John R. Bolton, Is There Really "Law" in International Affairs?
10 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2000) [hereinafter "Law"].
180. See Andreas Paulus, The War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law:
Hegemony or Pluralism? 25 MICH. J. INT'L L. 691, 708, 716-19, 724-27 (2004).
181. See Sean D. Murphy, Assessing the Legality of Invading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173,
n.291 (2004) (citing Vanity Fair Interview of Paul Wolfowitz with Sam Tannenhaus).
182. See Michael Hirsch, Bush and the World, Sept.-Oct. 2002, FOREIGN AFF., at 18.
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benchmark of international law and action.' Neoconservatism is
therefore theoretically committed to binding the hegemon to act on these
concerns. Wherever there is a serious infraction of these basic human
rights, it requires hegemonic intervention to remedy the problem.
Because it recognizes international law as a binding body of norms, it
becomes a more credible contender for a new conception of sovereignty.
Of course, the neoconservative position runs into the same kind of
practical limitations as its realistic counterpart. It may be suspected that
in practice, the neoconservative rhetoric leads to the same practical
results as the realist assertion of raw power.187 Its power will rarely, if
ever, be used without an accounting of the same factional interests that
the realist position elevates to ultimate supremacy. This is a practical
consequence of the tension between security and stability interests and
the value interests of the neoconservative position in the observation of
human rights standards.
Furthermore, the only candidate for hegemony, the United States,
lacks the military power to rule as a hegemonic power in the current
world climate. Today, it still has antagonists in the world., 88 On the
conventional scale, it lacks the military might to intervene everywhere at
once. Its military is currently stretched thin with the occupation and
military assistance in Iraq and its deployments in Afghanistan and the
Korean peninsula. 189 It may be surmised that if a new threat would arise,
it would lack the military and economic means of meeting it head-on
without compromising its position in these other scenarios. 90  The
186. See Murphy, supra note 182, at 173, n. 291 (citing Vanity Fair Interview of Paul
Wolfowitz with Sam Tannenhaus).
187. Thus, even the neoconservative view is faced with the dilemma of its stability
interest conflicting with its fundamental human rights values. This conflict has been
brought to the forefront in the war on terror. It has put before academics and world
leaders the question of whether the loss of civil life or the rights of terror suspects trump
the concern to seek out and destroy terrorist organizations. Thus far, it appears that
security and stability concerns have carried the day. See Editorial, Torture by Proxy,
N.Y. TIMES (late ed.), Mar. 8, 2005, at A22; Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario:
Terrorism Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 44,
n.230 (2005).
188. These antagonists certainly include Iran and North Korea, and may well be
extended to include the People's Republic of China, depending on the political climate on
the coasts of the Formosa Straights. On a certain detente between the U.S. and Iran, see
Najmeh Bozorgmehr, Doug Cameron & Guy Dinmore, Iran has Dual Role in Nuclear
and U.S. Oil Talks, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 27, 2005, at 12. On the current state of
talks with North Korea, see Anna Fifield, Conciliatory tone on North Korea Pleases
Seoul, FIN. TIMES (London), Feb, 4, 2005, at 3.
189. See Quentin Peel, A Full Agenda but a Dearth of Ideas, FIN. TIMES (London),
Jan. 20, 2005, at 19; JAMES A. BAKER, III AND LEE H. HAMILTON, Co-Chairs, THE IRAQ
STUDY GROUP REPORT 7 (2006), available at http://www.usip.org/isg/
iraq-study-group-report/report/1206/index.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
190. See id.
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administration's position on nuclear tests in North Korea and Iran shows
that it does not act on neoconservatist, hegemonic grounds. To the
contrary, the United States' actions in these scenarios, focusing on multi-
lateral pressures, commendably acts not as a hegemon at all, but as a
facilitator of negotiations.
A more serious practical threat comes from ideological groups that
operate iddependently of nation states, such as terrorist groups and
criminal cartels.19 1 While these enemies may not have the weapons or
the manpower to pose a serious conventional threat, military
miniaturization technology and asymmetric field tactics still put any
potential hegemon at grave risk. If one combines these threats, it is clear
that there is no world power in the position of dominance that the
classical Roman--or even the British Empire-enjoyed, arguably
because of the voluntarist bedrock of egalitarian sovereignty and its
practical effects on the world stage through the last fifty years. Any
hegemonic world order would thus remain fragile, contingent on the
economic and military support of its "vassal" states. Such hegemony has
historically been fraught with the most serious of complications, as the
Medieval Roman Empire so pertinently exemplifies.
192
Hegemony encounters even more serious challenges from the theory
of international law. These challenges can be summed under two
different headings: legal hegemony is internally inconsistent, and
hegemony undermines the foundational principles of general
international law, whether in a sophisticated natural law or in a
voluntarist tradition. These two problems are, of course, related. The
internal inconsistency can largely be explained by the deeper
philosophical underpinnings of international law. Yet, it is important to
deal with them in turn so as to understand just how untenable such a
hegemonic position truly is.
The internal inconsistency of hegemonic international law can be
explained in terms of H.L.A. Hart's classical formulation of what
constitutes a legal norm.193  According to Hart, law requires two
fundamental principles: its general availability to the public and a
generally recognized means of generating legal norms. 194  Hart
distinguishes the rule of brute force from the rule of law; in its historical
context, it was an attack on Austin's early legal positivism. 195  He
191. On the subversive influence of criminal organizations on the state, see generally
STRANGE, supra note 2. For a fictional account of their possible cooperation, see TOM
CLANCY, THE TEETH OF THE TIGER (2004).
192. See generally BARBARA TUCHMAN, A DISTANT MIRROR (1987).
193. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 18-99 (2d ed. 2004).
194. Id. at 90-99.
195. Id. at 18-76. For an insightful article on the historical development of English
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correctly points out that the fear of brute force lacks general normative
force; 196 it is an order one would do well not to refuse, yet it does not
have the normative character of law. Such normativity is only generated
when it is possible to ascribe rightful authority to an order or rule that is
capable of internalization. 197 This threshold of law requires that there is
a clear rule of law, rather than a chaotic attempt at organized coercion.
The rule of law also requires that a person know what primary rules have
binding character, and why he holds such a position by recourse to
secondary, power-conferring rules. 198 In other words, a person ought to
be able to sufficiently inform himself of the law to be able to follow it;
further, he ought to know the means by which a pronouncement becomes
law.
In terms of hegemonic law, both of these criteria become somewhat
doubtful. The realist position clearly fails both hurdles. It amounts to
little else than the subjection of the world to the gun of an international
strongman.199 Yet, the prima facie tenable neoconservative position runs
into problems as well. It is unclear whether it provides a means of
sufficient publication to nations for what standards of conduct ought to
be imposed on them. In Hartian terms, it is unclear whether there is a
rule of law with. regard to primary rules.2 °° More damningly, the
neoconservative position runs into somewhat of an aporia when it comes
to the generative principles of law-or Hart's secondary rules.20 1
The first problem concerns the public availability of what the law is.
At the moment, there is a practical lack of any information on such a
hegemonic "codification of international law. 20 2 What is available to
the world is a set of criteria that the United States, if it acted as a
hegemon, may apply to declare a nation to be a rogue state on which it
will keep a watchful eye.203 The three most important criteria to be
classified as a rogue are: (1) consistent disregard for international
obligations; (2) state-sponsored terrorism; and (3) the unsupervised
jurisprudence, see Neil Duxbury, English Jurisprudence between Austin and Hart, 91
VA. L. REv. 1 (2005). Arguably, Hart did not do Austin justice in his treatment. See
generally Gerald B. Wetlaufer, Gunmen, Straw Men, and Indeterminacy: H. L. A. Hart,
John Austin, and the Concept of Law, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1487 (1997).
196. HART, supra note 194, at 27-41.
197. Id. at 82-91.
198. Id. at 90-99.
199. See generally "Law," supra note 180.
200. HART, supra note 194, at 90-99.
201. Id.
202. The current administration does not even seem to acknowledge the existence of
the closest compilation to such a code. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702(d), (e) (1987).
203. National Security Council, The National Security Strategy of the United States of
America, http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nssall.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
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development of Weapons of Mass Destruction and advanced military
technology for aggressive purposes.2°4 This category of rogue states may
well be the only indication which the subjects of the potential hegemonic
international law may have as to its content. Currently, these criteria are
too vague for comfort, as a creative reading would make even the United
States, as well as most NATO member states, out to be international
rogues. 20 5 They arguably used force illegally in Kosovo. 20 6 They may
fund guerrilla groups with the intent to overthrow a foreign
government.0 7 Furthermore, most of these states currently also have
weapons of mass destruction-or at least easy access to them-without
international supervision. °8 If, for example, the United Kingdom and
Iran are in a similar legal position with regard to the rogue state standard,
then such a standard clearly fails the sufficient publication standard of
legal norms.20 9 Of course, it is not inconceivable that a clear legal
standard would be publicized to the world at large. Still, in the current
204. Id. at Part V. The full list runs as follows:
(1) brutalize their own people and squander their natural resources for the
personal gain of the rulers;
(2) display no regard for international law, threaten their neighbors, and
callously violate international treaties to which they are parties;
(3) are determined to acquire weapons of mass destruction, along with other
military technology, to be used as threats or offensively to achieve the
aggressive designs of these regimes;
(4) sponsor terrorism around the globe; and
(5) reject human values and hate the United States and everything it stands for.
Id. For further discussion, see John R. Bolton, Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, Beyond the Axis of Evil: Additional Threats from Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Remarks to the Heritage Foundation, http://www.state.gov/t/
us/rm/9962.htm (May 6, 2002) (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
205. See National Security Council, supra note 204.
206. See generally Louis Henkin, NATO's Kosovo Intervention: Kosovo and the Law
of Humanitarian Intervention, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 824 (1999).
207. Such incidents are rarely given the attention that they deserve. However, it is
undoubted that such efforts are part and parcel of the current foreign policy arsenal of the
United States. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, (Nicar.
v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27). The U.S.-led response to the Taliban in Afghanistan
can also been seen as funding guerilla groups to overthrow a foreign government. The
effort relied heavily to existing local opposition to the Taliban known as the Afghan
Northern Alliance to provide adequate ground forces to remove the Taliban regime.
Legitimate though the intervention was, the use and funding of guerrilla forces became a
much noted feature in the overall military and political strategy.
208. See generally David P. Fidler, International Law and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: End of the Arms Control Approach? 14 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 39
(2004).
209. Both states can arguably fulfill the criteria of rogue nations set by the U.S.
government. In the case of the U.K., its treatment of the Northern Irish may be
considered on the edge of "brutalizing;" its participation in the invasion of Iraq was a
callous violation of international law, it possesses weapons of mass destruction, and it
sponsors political movements which may or may not have an armed faction.
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political climate, it is unlikely that such a standard will ever be
developed.
The reason for this lack of publicity is the inherent impossibility of
finding a generally recognized means of generating such norms in a
hegemonic system. There are two chief means to achieve such a process:
reception and legislation. All other means are a combination of these
two extremes. 210  Neither of these means is feasible under the new
hegemonic paradigm. Reception-meaning the complete adoption of
foreign law as the new law of the land-goes against the grain of the
current hegemonic paradigm. 211  The legislative approach is equally
problematic.
Reception is a term of art. It signifies that a state accepts wholesale
the laws of a different country or time as its new law.21 2 The best
examples of reception are found on the European continent and its
adoption of the Roman law as its own during the late Middle Ages
through the Renaissance.213 This reception of the law was founded on
two complementary grounds: first, the Roman law was perceived to be
normatively superior to existing law;2 14 second, it was perceived as a
morally legitimate source to turn to due to the religious underpinnings
the Roman law evoked. After all, the law of the early Christian Empire
and its Church had an almost saintly penumbra.215 Such reception of
international law is unlikely in a hegemonic world order. It would
recognize an older and greater power to which the hegemon would admit
some type of allegiance. Yet, it is exactly the opposite that the current
hegemonic law seeks to achieve. It seeks to bond all others in allegiance
to the hegemon and the rules promulgated by it, not the hegemon in
allegiance to some outside first principles or foreign law.216
Legislation is equally problematic. The neoconservative position on
international hegemony was deemed acceptable due its recognition that a
210. This is a more inductive conclusion than a priori necessity. However, as law has
to come from somewhere, it seems reasonable to assert that a person either has to accept
someone else's efforts as his own, or he has to create his own independent legal regime.
211. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Linda
Greenhouse, Rehnquist Resumes his Call for Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES (late
ed.), Jan. 1, 2005, at A10.
212. See generally Reinhard Zimmermann, Roman-Dutch Jurisprudence and its
Contribution to European Private Law, 66 TuL. L. REV. 1685 (1992); George L. Gretton,
Reception without Integration?: Floating Charges and Mixed Systems, 78 TUL. L. REV.
307 (2003); M. H. Hoeflich, Translation & the Reception of Foreign Law in the
Antebellum United States, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 753 (2002).
213. See Zimmermann, supra note 213, at 1685.
214. See generally JOLOWICZ & NICHOLAS, HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
OF ROMAN LAW (3d ed. 1972).
215. Id.
216. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 586.
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hegemon remains bound by the standards it prescribes, at least in
theory.2" 7 Such a position is anathema to setting up a domestic process
of new legislation to codify international law. Putting aside the fact that
there is no qualified domestic legislative body in a hegemon to meet the
task, such a process afortiori would turn the neoconservative position
into its realist rival. It would no longer recognize some outside norm to
which the even the hegemon was bound. It would much rather place the
hegemon in a normative void in much the same way the realists did. In
other words, the hegemon would not be bound by law at all; the law
would only apply to other states.
The only theoretical exception to this problem stems from a curious
philosophical explanation of limited sovereignty in the Seventeenth
Century. Such a position would posit that a sovereign may impose limits
on itself by the means of an oath or covenant.21 8 Through such a self
limitation, it may be possible for a hegemonic power to bind itself to
some normative standards with regards to its subjects-here the
community of nations.219 However, this possibility is neglectful of the
underlying bright-line rule for the respect of fundamental rights which
leads to the debate of changing sovereignty. Unless such a position
would receive these rights as legally binding, it remains in the same
normative void as its realist cousin. Its covenant with the world would
otherwise enforce something less than the current voluntarist paradigm
has set out as a bare minimum respect of human rights. Such a regress is
unacceptable on a philosophical as well as a legal basis, as it would erode
the very rights it was meant to further. Moreover, Hart's keen analysis
throws open another flaw in this possibility that may prove even more
damning. If a domestic legislative model is indeed recognized as norm-
creating internationally, it would only take a domestic authorization in
accordance with the domestic constitution to undo the covenant made
with the rest of the world. 2a In the cruel way of the Seldenian sovereign,
a potential hegemon would then have acquired the allegiance of the
world with no price attached to it.
22'
If the neoconservative position is serious about the existence of
international law and its compatibility with hegemony, it must view a
hegemon as the enforcer, rather than the source of the fundamental
norms binding international society. Therefore, as neither reception nor
legislation are appropriate solutions (at least currently) for the generation
of legal rules under the hegemonic paradigm, there is no means by which
217. See supra Part IV.
218. See GROTIUS, supra note 14, at 1.3; GROTIUS TRANS., supra note 14, at 52.
219. Id.
220. See HART, supra note 194, at 90-99.
221. See NATURAL RIGHT, supra note 53, at 82-100 (1981).
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a hegemon could amount to more than a sophisticated highway robber if
it were to assert its hegemonic ambitions.
The conclusion against hegemony as a viable solution to
sovereignty stems from a Hartian analysis of the way in which it would
govern. In the final analysis, a hegemonic solution would not guarantee
a better anchor for the respect of rights. To the contrary, the hegemonic
solution is likely to undo the very normative fabric of international law.
The normative fabric of international law requires a public and a
procedural backdrop for its postulates to stand as more than brute
coercion. Hegemony is likely going to undo both of these requirements
because of our own historical contingencies. It is true that in the early
days of the international law tradition, hegemony was an accepted means
to further international law.2 22 However, in those days, there was an
underlying respect for the foundational principles of law that not even
the pontiff or emperor could violate.223 This respect was backed by the
very real power and fear of a universal religion. Hence, the argument
Dante made in Monarchia for the supreme power of the emperor must be
read in the context of his Inferno. 4  Today, there is no such fiber
holding together the law of nations. Thus, this solution lacks a key
conceptual component to function as an effective theory of law.
V. Federation
The value of human rights in a stable and peaceful international
system must find a different foundation than the ones discussed thus far.
The voluntarist paradigm is conducive to the worst offenses against
human dignity from the nation state.225 A reintroduction of hegemonic
sovereignty would lead to practical instabilities, as well as the inherent
dangers of the abuse of fundamental rights.226 In order to safeguard our
commitments to these values, a different system must be contemplated.
Such a system must have these fundamental principles of dignity at heart.
It must also provide for adequate checks and balances in order to curtail
the nascent abuses of such fundamental rights and protect its overarching
value-based consensus. Such a system is the growing federation of like-
minded states.227
222. See DE VISSCHER, supra note 33, at 17.
223. GREwE, supra note 19, at 96.
224. See 1 DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DivINE COMEDY 34.10-15.
225. See supra Part II.
226. One such example is the practice of rendition the current U.S. administration is
engaged in. See Torture by Proxy, supra note 188. Another example is the torture which
the United States exposes Guantanamo Bay inmates to. See Europarat verurteilt U.S.A.
wegen Folter, Sueddeutsche Zeitung, Apr. 26, 2005, http://www.sueddeutsche.de/
,tt2m3/ausland/artikel/39/51987/ (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
227. For a practical description of how such a federation can work, see COOPER, supra
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A federal approach to international peace and security is by no
means novel. In his exposition of the rising security problems of the
twenty-first century, Robert Cooper eloquently draws on such a
perspective to provide new guidance. 228  Still, how such a notion of
federation can be borne out of the international legal discourse on the
question of sovereignty has not been sufficiently elaborated there or
elsewhere. 229 According to Cooper, sovereignty is either understood as a
break with current legal tradition, or at least as a postmodern twist on the
existing concept. 230 These approaches to sovereignty are insufficient to
make a lasting impact on the international law tradition.231 In order for
them to have legal significance, they must be explored in the language
and tradition of international law. The last section of this article provides
a sketch of what such an apology of federal sovereignty in international
law should resemble.
In order to recast the idea of sovereignty, one must look first to
philosophical foundations capable of achieving such a paradigm shift.
Any reinterpretation of the law logically is only as capable as this
underlying political philosophy allows. The problem with a postmodern
basis for sovereignty is the inherent philosophical weakness of its
outlook. Postmodernism, as the term has been understood in the Anglo-
Saxon context, is deeply wedded to a realist-relativist outlook.232  The
realist outlook is notoriously incapable of creating the needed ideological
cohesion for a rights-based recasting of the idea of sovereignty. In as
much as it looks to the political landscape for guidance, it puts the cart
before the horse when it comes to exercises in reconstruction. In a
curious way then, it is caught by the very same trappings of the
philosophies it critiques; it remains glued to the modem rationalist and
liberal approach which spawned voluntarist positivism. 233 In looking for
alternative ways of defining sovereignty, the realist-relativist outlook
will inevitably remain in the realm of politics rather than law. This
outlook is intriguingly a priori unable to escape Simma's and Verdross'
note 3, at 78-80.
228. See id.
229. Id.; JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 27-44.
230. COOPER, SUpra note 3, at55-151.
231. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 35-37.
232. See, e.g., RICHARD RORTY, CONTINGENCY, IRONY, AND SOLIDARITY (1989). The
European understanding of postmodernism is infinitely more complex, as it is sometimes
taken to encompass phenomenalism, its instantiation in the work of Husserl's immediate
lineage, as well as post-structuralism and deconstruction philosophy. Hence, it tracks a
variety of schools of such noted authors as: Heidegger, Gadamer, Deleuze, Derrida, and
Foucault. The criticism of postmodernism presented here cannot account for their
philosophical work, which is infinitely more sophisticated than its American namesake.
233. See generally RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND SOCIAL HOPE (1999).
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criticism of federalism made in the 1980S. 2 34
The philosophical solution that this article suggests is deeply rooted
in civic humanism.235 Civic humanism originated in the Florentine
Rinascimento as a reaction to the chaos of the Middle Ages and its
rampant penchant for despotism and tyranny. It was kindled by the
rediscovery of classical wisdom in the civil law and classical moral
discourse.236 It is from this renewed interest in classical philosophy that
the concept of human dignity, so precious to any meaningful
reconception of sovereignty, arose.237 This philosophy is rooted in civic
participation and civic education in the classical moral virtues. Its
political philosophy was deeply rooted in a revival of classical natural
law theories with a distinctly Ciceronian bend. 38
Today, civic humanism is far from dead. Rather, it has become part
and parcel of a communitarian revival of Republican thought.239 In
political philosophy and the history of ideas, this approach is gaining
ever greater momentum. Since the late 1970s, it has gained acceptance
as one of the few viable alternative conceptions of political society to a
rationalist liberal philosophy so brilliantly brought into the late
Twentieth Century by John Rawls.240 Nevertheless, few have asked how
this particular political outlook would impact foundational concepts of
international law.241 Relying explicitly on the humanist philosophical
tradition, this article reconstructs an adequate conception of sovereignty
paying due regard to the fundamental importance of its respect to human
dignity.
VI. Humanist Sovereignty
The humanist tradition has historically been prolific on questions of
international law. Both Bodin and Alciato, the founders of the idea of
242sovereignty, were humanists. 2 Grotius and Selden also remained
234. VERDROSS & SIMMA, supra note 27, at 35-37.
235. For an interesting introduction to civic humanism as a relevant starting point for
today's political philosophy, see generally QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE
LIBERALISM (1997).
236. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 84-88.
237. See PICO DELLA MIRANDOLA, DE HOMINIS DIGNITATE (Gerd von der G6nna ed.,
1997).
238. 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, VISIONS OF POLITICS (2002).
239. See generally PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT (1999); MCINTYRE, supra note 18.
240. See generally JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (2d ed. 1999); JOHN RAWLS,
THE LAW OF PEOPLES (2001).
241. Such scholarship is most often found in the historical rather than legal fields.
See generally NATURAL RIGHT supra note 53; RICHARD TUCK, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND
PEACE (1999).
242. See FOUNDATIONS supra note 13, at 203-06; 2 QUENTIN SKINNER, THE
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deeply influenced by the humanist tradition.243 While the British openly
broke with the humanist tradition in the post-Seldenian Oxford circle-
most notably amongst its members-Thomas Hobbes, the continental
tradition of international law, remained firmly influenced by humanist
scholarship.244 The most sophisticated answer of this continuation of
civic humanism was Emerich de Vattel's Le Droit des Gens.245 This
work addressed sovereignty teleologically. It posited that sovereignty
must be used for the benefit of the governed and the formation of a well-
246governed state. This approach hence views sovereignty not as a
justification of state power, but as a functional concept for the protection
of fundamental natural rights.
The relevance of such an abstract notion of sovereignty needs to be
put in practical perspective. By treating sovereignty as a functional
concept with the goal of furthering the rights of participating citizens, it
becomes possible to explain the supremacy of human rights over state
rights. The impact of the ICCPR on sovereignty was discussed
previously.247 Now, it is possible to justify the central place of such a
codification of fundamental human rights. They no longer remain
positive human rights within the ambit of state consent and state
power.248 They can now be cast in the vestiges of fundamental natural
rights. This shift from positive to natural rights in the context of a
teleological understanding of sovereignty for the betterment of human
society as a whole allows for an important insight. Sovereignty and
sovereign action can now be made conditional on the respect of these
fundamental principles. In as far as the principles are the expression of
basic human dignity in political society, any government action which
violates them ceases to be sovereign.249
Such a distinction has important consequences for the law of
sovereignty. Most of all, it would cause a momentous shift in the law of
state responsibility, sovereign immunity, international criminal justice,
and the field of humanitarian intervention. While a detailed discussion
of these consequences is beyond the scope of this article, a quick sketch
of their change in outlook is required to fully grasp the impact of a return
FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT (1978) 290-93.
243. See NATURAL RIGHT, supra note 53, at 58-100.
244. Id. On the relationship between later British political philosophy to humanism,
see QUENTIN SKINNER, REASON AND RHETORIC IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF HOBBES (1997).
245. See VATTEL, supra note 6, at 1.4, § 39, 51; VATTEL TRANS., supra note 6, at 13,
17(1879).
246. See id.
247. See supra Part III.
248. See Vienna Convention, supra note 25, at art. 64.
249. See CHRISTOPHER G. WEERAMANTRY, UNIVERSALIZING INTERNATIONAL LAW 37
(2004).
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to a civic humanist, natural law perspective in the law of sovereignty.
Architecturally, the significance of this new perspective most
deeply affects the law of state responsibility, which is defined as
responsibility for internationally wrongful acts attributable to the state. °
Such wrongful acts are committed by the state's act or omission of an
international obligation.251 A reconception of state sovereignty in terms
of the state's respect for the fundamental principles of human dignity
will drastically increase the kinds of actions for which a state is
internationally responsible. Because the natural rights arising out of the
fundamental principle of human dignity have become international law, a
state may now be responsible for its domestic actions on the international
stage.252 Furthermore, such violations would also be beyond cure even if
the relevant government agency gives official consent.253 Because of the
definition of sovereignty in terms of its respect and furtherance of human
dignity, such consent would not be a sovereign action-even worse, it
may also be an internationally wrongful act.254
The significance of such a stance on state responsibility is great.
The current practice of rendition of prisoners by the United States
government to foreign governments is an important example. 255 This
practice is already of dubitable legality in the international sphere.256 A
definition of sovereignty that would vitiate state consent as a means of
curing an internationally wrongful act would effectively rob the United
States of any and all defenses it may have with regard to such
257treatment. No state may consent to such actions. Hence, there is not
even the slightest leeway with such practices. By addressing horrendous
practices like rendition directly through a recasting of sovereignty, a
powerful tool is added to the arsenal of analyzing threats to international
peace and security, as well as a means to their just resolution.
This just resolution would not necessarily have to come from the
diplomatic stage; it could also come from national and international
250. Draft Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted
by the International Law Commission at its fifty-third session, in OFFICIAL RECORD OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE WORK OF ITS FIFTY-THIRD SESSION,
OFFICIAL RECORDS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, FIFTY-SIXTH SESSION, at ch. IV.E. 1, art. 1,
Supp. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Nov. 2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles].
251. Id. at art. 2.
252. See id. at art. 12.
253. See id. at art. 20.
254. Id.
255. See Torture by Proxy, supra note 188.
256. Draft Articles, supra note 251, at art. 16 (assuming that the practices used by the
host state violate Article 7 of the ICCPR and that the United States had knowledge of
such practices in the host state regarding prisoners).
257. Interestingly, international criminal justice already robs individuals of such
immunities before its bar. See discussion infra.
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court. With regard to the pursuit of legal action against states violating
these principles, the question of sovereign immunity comes into sharp
light.2s8 Sovereign immunity has all too often proven a bar to legal
action against a state for its violation of such fundamental human
rights.259 Yet, with a recasting of sovereignty in terms of its humanist
heritage, the question would become moot. By definition, sovereign
immunity can only attach to the sovereign acts of a state. If an act were
characterized as essentially lacking sovereign authority, no such bar
could exist. In this regard, the humanist position would by far exceed the
current position of the International Law Commission (ILC) on questions
of sovereign immunity regarding torts actions against a foreign
government.260 The ILC's proposed solution to tortious government
action is to allow an exception to sovereign immunity where an action
took place in whole or in part in the forum state. 261 The humanist
position would completely dispense with such a requirement. In denying
sovereign status to the state action violating basic human rights
principles, the tortious state act looses all claims to special immunities.
The only remaining question would become whether the forum state is
indeed the best available forum for a suit to lie-a question which U.S.
jurisprudence correctly classifies as a prudential concern for the sound
discretion of the judge.262
The action would not thereby become a private action.263 It can still
be firmly attributed to the state. 264 However, such a categorization as an
official state action cuts against immunity. By violating the very
international preconditions to sovereignty, the state has acted ultra vires.
Such ultra vires action can be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law,
as it falls outside the realm of sovereign immunity. As there is no
immunity regarding the act, and because there are no specific grounds
258. This section of the paper has greatly benefited from a talk given by Professor
Handl on the topic of sovereign immunity in the spring of 2005. I thank him for an
insightful and inspiring roundtable discussion. He deserves credit for many of the ideas
presented below. However, flaws in their execution remain firmly rooted with the author.
259. See Stephen C. McCaffrey, The Thirty Fourth Session of the International Law
Commission, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 323, 328-29 (1983) (discussing the process of the ILC on
sovereign immunity and noting that the ILC was struggling with absolute immunity of
sovereign action under general international law).
260. See United Nations Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their
Property, GA Res. 59/38 (Dec. 2, 2004); for a discussion of the Convention, see generally
David P. Stewart, Current Development: The U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional
Immunities of States and Their Property, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 194 (2005).
261. U.N. Convention on Jurisdictional Immunities of States and Their Property,
supra note 261, at art. 12.
262. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 257 (1981).
263. Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. BeIg.) 2002 I.C.J. 121,
61 (Feb. 14, 2002), reprinted in 41 I.L.M. 536, 551-52 (2002).
264. See discussion of state responsibility supra.
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need to be pled to vitiate immunity, judgments may be entered against a
state and may be enforced against the assets of any of its agencies in the
jurisdiction.265
Similar consequences can be anticipated in the nascent field of
international criminal law. 266  Currently, there is a noticeable strain
between the law of sovereignty and international criminal law.267  By
moving outside the scope of state responsibility and vitiating all
immunities of a person before its bar, the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court is leading a frontal assault against the way
sovereignty is currently understood.268 The strong underlying voluntarist
principles of jurisdiction somewhat mitigate its impact on the
development of international law as a whole.269 This principle is further
underscored by the fact that ad hoc criminal tribunals may still have to
recognize immunities ratione materiae on the basis of official
capacity. 27°  Viewed in the context of a humanist recasting of
sovereignty, the Rome Statute's position is essentially sound, whereas
the position of its sister tribunals is not. As there is no sovereign act
which can lend cover for the actions made punishable under the Rome
Statute, most immunities, save the functional immunity of a sitting head
of government or foreign minister ratione personae,271 are rendered void
ab initio. Therefore, international criminal justice already appears to
operate under the auspices of a humanist natural law theory. As such, it
may require a natural law recasting of sovereignty to remain in sync with
the remainder of general international law.
272
The question of humanitarian intervention may prove more
troubling.273 Its permissibility unabashedly forms the cornerstone of
natural law sovereignty. 274  Since its inception, the leading natural
lawyers have held it out as an honorific act of princes to free foreign
265. See generally Letelier v. The Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790 (2d Cir. 1984).
266. See generally Dapo Akande, International Law Immunities and the International
Criminal Court, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 407 (2004).
267. Id.
268. Id. at 419-30; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 25(4), 27,
entered into force July 1, 2002; but see id. at art. 98.
269. Akande, supra note 267, at 417.
270. See generally Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. No. IT-95-14-AR, Objection to
Issue of Subpoena Duces Tecum (Oct. 29, 1997); Akande, supra note 267, at 418.
271. See Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000, supra note 264.
272. For a critique of the ICC as futile due its lack of cohesion with general
international law and politics see generally Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating
International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 89 (2003).
273. See LYONS & MASTANDUNO, supra note 94, at 252-60 (introducing the problem
of whether the current system of sovereignty has moved beyond a state-based system and
concluding that while there are indications to the contrary, such a shift has not yet
occurred).
274. See supra Part II.
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peoples from tyrannical rule.275  In the current international security
climate, such a position needs important checks and balances. Without
these checks and balances, a natural law position on international law in
general, and sovereignty in particular, may prove devastating. This may
lead to the war against all which Thomas Hobbes so effectively conjures
as the ultimate reason for respect of state power.276 The check and
balance required to temper natural law sovereignty is that of conscious
federalism. 277  Such a conscious federalism must establish rigorous
requirements for humanitarian intervention and must explain that the use
of force is the last resort, rather than a fast tool to impose one's will.
These qualitative criteria must further be backed by a procedural
apparatus that stands in the way of the foolhardy use of force.
A well-conceived federal system provides such a system. It
imposes several stages of deliberation in the respective domestic
executives, followed by their common deliberations between themselves.
These deliberations are in turn checked by independent federal structures
of accountability in the form of common independent courts and
common independent executive leadership. Once an action has
successfully passed through all of these stages of deliberation, it may
safely be surmised that the international security architecture will not be
exposed to overeager interventions. Rather, the international architecture
would again have an effective means through which the evils of the
Balkans, Rwanda, Darfour, and many other theaters of atrocities could
effectively be stopped for the sake of peace and human dignity.
Civic humanism is philosophically predisposed to a federalist
position. The bulk of humanist learning is centered on shared
2781humanity. Where it is not explicitly cosmopolite, the logic of its
arguments implicitly makes it SO. 2 7 9  Yet, such a philosophical
predisposition is insufficient to counter the latent international security
threats we face today. A more stable federalist structure must be
constructed in order to safeguard such a humanist conception of
275. See, e.g., BODIN, supra note 29, at 2.5; BODIN TRANS., supra note 10, at 113 n. 1.
276. See Lori Fisler Damrosch & Bernhard H. Oxman, Agora: Future Implications of
the Iraq Conflict: Editors' Introduction, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553 (2003); see generally
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Richard Tuck ed., rev. ed. 1996).
277. Again, this position is better reached through inductive reasoning rather than
deductive logic. Voluntarist sovereignty has been critiqued in Part III above; hegemony
has been excluded as a viable alternative in Part IV. Short of states becoming lambs by
their own volition, a federal approach seems to be the only remaining alternative.
278. See generally PETRARCA, supra note 46; BRUNI, supra note 46. On the
cosmopolitan background of the humanists' source material, see Gisela Striker, Origins
of the Concept of Natural Law, 2 PROC. BOSTON AREA COLLOQ. ANCIENT PHIL. 79
(1986); James Bohman, Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global
Political Authority, 84(1) MONIST. 3 (2001).
279. See generally MIRANDOLA, supra note 238.
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sovereignty from imploding.28 °
The starting point for this conception of federal sovereignty must
remain a deep commitment to treating sovereignty as a teleological
concept for the pursuit of human dignity.2811t is this commitment which,
in Cooper's treatment of federation, erodes the notion of positive
sovereignty for the benefit of a postmodem understanding of shared
values.282 As has been established, it is not necessary to justify this end
through a postmodern erosion of sovereignty. Rather, it is possible to
give a philosophical accounting of a strengthened conception of
sovereignty from the same political circumstances. Cooper correctly
points out that such a federation must grow by necessity. 283 It must break
down historical barriers of distrust. In order to do so, however, the
federation must realign itself not by notions of nationality, but through
identification with shared interests across boundaries. Such realignment
is not inimical to a natural law understanding; indeed, the humanist will
point to precedent for such a position in the founding days of Rome.284
In order to achieve a politically stable federation on the grounds of a
civic humanist understanding of sovereignty, recent history would
suggest that two distinct requirements should be met.285  The first
requirement is entirely prudential: following the earlier voluntarist
paradigm in the formulation of a treaty which purports to bind the several
members of the federation to meet in their national capacities to discuss
issues of common interest and take common action. The second branch,
which is of deeper theoretical importance, is the establishment of
common institutions that are disjointed from national rule and are
enabled to bind national governments to their principled commitments.28 6
These two requirements are the foundational procedural aspects of the
European experiment. By combining a ministerial council with the
European Union (E.U.) Commission and the European court system, the
E.U. succeeded in building a stable and lasting federation of states in the
pursuit of common values.
In order to establish that these two ingredients are the correct checks
and balances on humanist sovereignty, their theoretical value must be
280. Arguably, such a humanist position could be made to fit with the
neoconservative perspective discussed in supra Part IV. The problems of "humanism in
one country" could, however, be cured through a federalist approach.
281. See generally MIRANDOLA, supra note 238; VATTEL, supra note 6, at 1.4, § 39,
51; VATTEL TRANS., supra note 6, at 13, 17.
282. See COOPER, supra note 3, at 129.
283. Seeid.atl7l.
284. PLUTARCH, NUMA, in PLUTARCH'S LvEs (Arthur Clough ed., 2001).
285. See Ellis, supra note 155, at 198-99; Paolo G. Carozza, Subsidiarity as a
Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 38 (2003).
286. Carozza, supra note 286, at 38.
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explored. The voluntarist foundation of sovereignty in the form of a
treaty is theoretically more difficult to integrate in the civic humanist
conception of sovereignty. After all, the civic humanist perspective is
based on natural law, rather than positive conception of law. In fact, the
continued existence of national sovereignty is deeply troubling for the
civic humanist tradition. It is quite capable of reversing the development
away from a state-centered sovereignty toward its rights-based cousin.
The value of a voluntarist foundation comes from the conservative
bias it adds to path-breaking decisions. This conservative bias is a
stabilizing factor in the international security arena. The maintenance of
strong state governments has had the advantage of keeping the European
Union out of the war in Iraq. Local political pressures against the war
were clearly felt in a panoply of national governments.287 While several
European leaders made the decision to go to war against popular
sentiments, the E.U. did not go down that path. 288  The theoretical
explanation for this development can be put into relatively simple terms:
a strong federal government unifies political power.289 As such, it is
possible for relatively few political leaders to take action, even if it is
against the will of their respective political societies. In the case of a
weak federal structure, it could well be the case that several leaders may
make a similar decision for their own home state. Yet, it is almost
certain that in the face of grave public discomfort, a majority of states
will make a different decision. 290 This majority will in turn be able to
mount a significant amount of pressure against the use of force when it is
not strictly necessary. In light of recent events, such a retardant for
international action is a much needed coolant for international peace and
security.
Nevertheless, the ideal version of federal sovereignty in the
humanist paradigm would look distinctly different from the prudential
approach found in the E.U. The ideal version would take its cue from
Aristotle, advising on small governmental units.291 Such smaller, sub-
national units would govern more efficiently, as well as allow more room
287. See Judy Dempsey & Quentin Peel, Sunday's Surprise Defeat of the Ruling
Party Showed that Voters' Hostility to the War in Iraq had been Reawakened. Some
Wonder Whether Europe Could Drift Away from Support for Fighting Terror, FIN. TIMES
(London), Mar. 16, 2004, at 19.
288. See id.
289. See generally Philip R. Trnmble, The President's Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM.
J. INT'L L. 750 (1989).
290. See the discussion of "veto-gates" in the passage of Congressional legislation in
the U.S. in ESKRIDGE, FRICKEY & GARRETT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 1-38
(3d ed. 2001).
291. See generally ARISTOTLE, POLITICS, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE:
THE REVISED OXFORD TRANSLATION (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984).
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for direct citizen participation. Active and educated citizenship is the
ideal of any humanist conception of politics. 292 In considering a political
model of federal sovereignty, a humanist tradition would likely prefer to
grant regions, rather than countries, large autonomy to achieve these
goals. 293 These smaller units would be able to provide more effective
civic education, and would foster a sense of political community so
dearly lacking from our contemporary world.
The second element of federal sovereignty is far more easily
justified. The existence of strong and independent federal institutions
safeguarding individual rights against state infringement must be the
centerpiece of any political system that hopes to capture the
philosophical lessons of civic humanism. After all, history is replete
with examples of the most well-meaning state putting the very rights it
stands to preserve in jeopardy.294 The function of an independent federal
branch of government must be to point out the limits of sovereignty.2 95 It
must ensure that the sovereign states it supervises stay within the ambit
of their powers. To this end, the European experience has attempted to
forge an independent executive and judiciary to deal with exactly such
questions. On the whole, it has been successful.2 96
However, the notion that the member states of any union or
federation seize some of their sovereignty to such institutions must be
dispelled. It is in these terms that the European experience is
traditionally cast.297 Such a perspective on the European experience is
viewed exclusively in terms of the voluntarist paradigm-as the
limitation of states' rights for the benefit of a higher authority federal
29structure. 98 While such an analysis holds true for several aspects of the
structure of the E.U., it misses the point where the conception of
sovereignty is concerned. The revolutionary potential of a humanist,
federal understanding of sovereignty comes from moving away from the
original voluntarist paradigm. By so doing, the paradigm shift which is
still in the making can be appreciated. If viewed from this different
vantage point, there is no actual transfer of sovereignty. Far from taking
sovereignty from the member states, the federal structures actually foster
292. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 13, at 88-91; 122-23; 241-43.
293. This was the ideal of the free Italian city states in the early Rinascimento. See id.
at 186-89.
294. Sadly, one of last examples of such an occurrence was not held in check even by
a strong independent judiciary. See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214
(1944).
295. See Carozza, supra note 286, at 38.
296. See id.
297. See, e.g., Tony Weir, ALL or Nothing, 78 TuL. L. REv. 511 (2004).
298. Id.
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and safeguard national sovereignty. 299 By curtailing government action
which stands in violation of basic principles of human dignity and
welfare, these structures enforce the underlying teleological justification
for humanist sovereignty. 300 They do not impose foreign restraints on
government action, but simply watch out for their "constitutionality." In
other words, rather than being the evil stepmother, federal institutions
take the role of a loving and experienced chaperone.
The federal idea of sovereignty is based on the fundamental
commitment to the basic notion of human rights as developed from the
idea of human dignity. In its federal structure, sovereignty attempts to
keep state power true to its initial commitment, which it may otherwise
cast aside in times when immediate interest outweighs its underlying
ideals. 30 1  In return, a federal structure promises greater economic
stability and international clout. By forming a federation, like-minded
states will be able to bring the idea of human dignity to the world stage
through their combined political weight.
The humanist conception of federal sovereignty is clearly a
stabilizing factor in international relations. In his analysis, Cooper
correctly points out that with the growth of a federal ideal, our means of
diffusing and reacting to international conflicts drastically increase.30 2
The self-evident, yet often overlooked, stabilizing factor remains that
nations bound in the federal structure are increasingly unlikely to create
international conflicts with each other. In the case of the European
Union, with the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Poland as
current members, and with the potential accession of the Balkan states
and Turkey, nearly every powder keg of modern warfare on the western
hemisphere will be pacified. A more subtle factor is the political muscle
which such a federation can wield.30 3 It has increased economic clout
and available military options for the direst circumstances. Due to the
daily necessities of cross-cultural governance in such a federal structure,
such a federal sovereign would further be able to negotiate more
effectively in troubled regions. Of course, these means of persuasion are
far from perfect; in fact, the European Union has yet to stop a single
military or civil conflict before it escalates. Still, the long-term potential
299. See VATTEL, supra note 6, at 1.4, § 39, 51; VATTEL TRANS., supra note 6, at 13,
17.
300. See generally MIRANDOLA, supra note 238; CICERO, DE OFF1CIIS, in MARCUS
TULLIUS CICERO, ON DUTIES (Walter Miller trans., 1913).
301. For an example of such a check of excessive power in the U.S. context due to a
reawakening independent judiciary, see Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004).
302. See COOPER, supra note 3, at 170-71.
303. One such nascent attempt by European states to use their combined clout was the
official denouncement of U.S. conduct in Guantanamo Bay by the Council of Europe.
See Europarat verurteilt USA wegen Folter, supra note 227.
2006]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
both to defend the value of human dignity as a condition of sovereignty,
and to use the requisite means to make it a more globally accepted basis
for government action, is already a huge step in the right direction.
Finally, a federal understanding of sovereignty also satisfies the
larger philosophical ambitions of the civic humanism. Humanism
remains a deeply cosmopolitan philosophy.3°  Its cosmopolitan goal
finds expression in the potential which this model of federal sovereignty
opens up for cross-cultural dialogue. Federal sovereignty-and the
humanist natural law tradition in general-have universal aspirations.
30 5
However, these aspirations are not expressed in the form of a "one size
fits all" mentality. Rather, they attempt to bridge cross-cultural gaps
through mutual engagement in discussion and through truly global civic
education. The virtue of civic participation at the core of the humanist
tradition translates to the international stage. Through engaging each
other in this dialogue on the premise of the respect of human dignity, we
may yet find the value in a truly multicultural community of nations. In
this dialogue, we may also find the key to lasting international peace and
security. 30 6 Such a final good-the political oikeiosis 30 7 of stoic ethics-
is certainly utopian and yet all the more desirable.308
VII. Conclusion
This article examined the changing nature of sovereignty, starting
from the premise that sovereignty, as the basic functional concept of
international law, forms the cornerstone of any solution to international
peace and security problems. It used the fundamental and unalterable
commitment to human dignity and fundamental human rights as a guide
in its examination of the different competing options. In so doing, it
examined the underlying historical and philosophical systems of
304. See James Bohman, supra note 279, at 3.
305. See generally CICERO, DE LEGIBUS, in MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO, ON THE
REPUBLIC, ON LAWS (Clinton W. Keyes trans., 1928).
306. In the words of a Nobel peace laureate: "We now are emerging into an age when
different civilizations will have to learn to live side by side in peaceful interchange,
learning from each other, studying each other's history and ideals, art and culture,
mutually enriching each other's lives. The only alternative in this overcrowded little
world is misunderstanding, tension, clash-and catastrophe." See Gunnar Jahn,
Presentation Speech: Nobel Peace Prize 1957 (Dec. 10, 1957),
http://nobelprize.org/peace/laureates/1957/press.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2007).
307. Oikeiosis means the stoic highest good.
308. While such a state of affairs certainly is a utopia on the stage of international
relations, small "experimental communities" which attempt to teach these ideals through
practical application and academic study do exist and have been successful for the last
forty-three years under the watchful eye of open-minded world leaders and Nobel Peace
laureates. See United World Colleges Home Page, www.uwc.org (last visited Jan. 16,
2007).
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sovereignty and their relationship to international security and found that
the notion of sovereignty originated with the humanist natural law
tradition in response to medieval power struggles between the Empire,
Church and local princes. From these origins, an ever-growing discourse
on sovereignty as the ultimate guarantor of state rights and state power
developed.
This conception culminated in the voluntarist paradigm of
international law, which while being theoretically only a stop gap
measure in the face of European political instability, has remained the
underlying philosophical basis of international law for the last 190 years.
This article also examined the colossal failure of the voluntarist system
of sovereignty to guarantee the fundamental principles of human dignity.
This failure was the reason the voluntarist system crumbled over the last
few years. It is also a root cause of the lack of a coherent global strategy
to holistically address the security threats we face in the Twenty-First
Century.
With the waning influence of voluntarist thought, this article looked
for alternatives to international orthodoxy. It found such alternatives in
the hegemonic theory of sovereignty advanced by the neoconservative
school of thought and in a humanist, federal recasting of sovereignty. It
concluded that hegemonic sovereignty cannot theoretically qualify as a
legal theory due to the lack of legal stability which it engenders, and
practically fails, due to the overwhelming military commitments it would
require of the hegemonic power to "police" a world populated by
asymmetric security threats. Faced with the impasse of hegemonic
sovereignty, this article examined the option of continuing in the pre-
voluntarist natural law tradition. For good or for ill, the only means of
safeguarding the basic and inalienable value of human dignity and of
providing a manageable approach to international security problems
remains with a natural law recasting of sovereignty.
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